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The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and the Nazi Genocide in Ukraine

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the involvement of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in Nazi genocide during World War II in Ukraine. The issue of the political rehabilitation of these organizations became one of the central political issues in this post-Soviet state. The research question is whether leaders and members of the Bandera faction of the OUN (OUN-B) and the UPA were involved in the Nazi-led genocide. This article devotes particular attention to Volhynia where the UPA was established by the OUN-B in 1943. The study analyzes the biographies of 329 OUN-B and UPA leaders and documents concerning the OUN-B and the UPA, local police, and Nazi mass executions of Jews, Ukrainians, and Poles from the State Archive of the Volyn Region, the State Archive of the Rivne Region, the Archive of the State Security Service of Ukraine in the Volyn Region, the Archive of the State Security Service of Ukraine, the National Archives in the US, and other archives. This paper shows that large proportions of leaders and members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army served in various police and militia formations, collaborated with security and intelligence agencies of Nazi Germany, and took part in the Nazi genocide, primarily in assisting roles during mass executions of Jews in the first two years of the Nazi occupation of Ukraine.

OUN and UPA Controversies

The political rehabilitation of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) became one of the central political issues in post-Soviet Ukraine, especially after the “Orange Revolution” (Katchanovski, “Terrorists or National Heroes,” “Politics of World War II,” Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, “Anti-Soviet Partisans,” *Orhanizatsia*; Shevel). During Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency in 2005–10, his bloc “Our Ukraine,” other nationalist parties, and many mass media outlets pursued the complete political rehabilitation of the OUN and the UPA. They portrayed these organizations as a mass national liberation movement that fought against both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union for Ukrainian independence, and they presented the leaders of the OUN and the UPA as national heroes. In 2007, President Yushchenko posthumously awarded the Hero of Ukraine title to Roman Shukhevych, the Supreme Commander of the UPA, and in 2010 to Stepan Bandera, the leader of the main faction of the OUN (OUN-B).

The leaders of Poland and Russia, the European Parliament, and the Simon Wiesenthal Center in the United States publicly condemned Yushchenko’s awarding of the title of Hero of Ukraine to Stepan Bandera by pointing out OUN’s collaboration with Nazi Germany and OUN’s involvement in mass murder.¹ After Victor Yanukovich became president of Ukraine, the courts annulled Yushchenko’s presidential decrees awarding the Hero of Ukraine titles to Bandera and Shukhevych, but UPA and OUN leaders continue to be commemorated at the local level in Western Ukraine, especially Galicia and Volhynia. Svoboda, a radical nationalist party that regards itself as an ideological successor of the OUN, won local elections in 2010 in Galicia and received 10.5% of the votes in the 2012 parliamentary elections in Ukraine.

Radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organizations and groups of football ultras with similar political views played a key role in toppling of the Yanukovych government by force. They led attempts to storm the presidential administration on December 1, 2013 and the Ukrainian parliament on January 19, 2014 and February 18, 2014 and seizures of regional and Kyiv City administrations and militia and SBU regional headquarters, primarily in Western Ukraine. Radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organizations, such as Trident named after Stepan Bandera, Patriot of Ukraine, White Hammer and UNA-UNSO, formed Right Sector, a paramilitary organization. It seized de-facto power in the Rivne and Volyn Regions. These Right Sector organizations and Svoboda regarded themselves as ideological successors of the OUN and the UPA to various degrees. OUN symbols, such as the red and black flag, and its greeting “Glory to Ukraine – Glory to Heroes,” were widely used not only by the far-right but also by mainstream opposition.²

However, polls conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology show that the OUN, the UPA, and their respective leaders Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych are only popular among the majority of Svoboda voters and among residents in Galicia. Their positive views are in the minority among voters of all other major parties, all generations and residents of other regions, including Kyiv. Only 1 percent of Ukrainians expressed positive views of Adolf Hitler actions in Ukraine during World War II. (Katchanovski, “Politics of World War II”, “Role of Far-Right,” “Terrorists or National Heroes”).

The political controversy concerning the OUN and the UPA raises a question concerning their role in the Nazi genocide during World War II. The charges of the collaboration by the OUN and the UPA with Nazi Germany and their involvement in the Nazi-led mass murders have been dismissed by the proponents of the political rehabilitation and heroization of the these

organizations. They argued that these charges were unfounded since they relied primarily on evidence provided by the Soviet authorities, in particular, the KGB (Committee for State Security), with the aim to discredit the OUN and the UPA in both Ukraine and abroad during the Cold War. For example, President Yushchenko stated that the UPA, in particular its commander, Roman Shukhevych, did not conduct any anti-Jewish actions. The president maintained that, on the contrary, the UPA lost 6,000 members fighting the Nazi forces, and that the UPA included many Jews and saved many Jews during the war.³

The nationalist politicians and many historians in Ukraine argued that the OUN-B was forced to collaborate with Nazi Germany not for ideological reasons, but because it was in interest of the pro-independence struggle and that this collaboration effectively ended after the Nazi leadership refused to accept a declaration of a Ukrainian state by OUN-B leaders in Lviv on June 30, 1941. These politicians and historians emphasized that many OUN-B leaders and ordinary members, including Bandera, were arrested, imprisoned in concentration camps, or executed by the Nazis. They presented the UPA as a guerrilla army, which included not only ethnic Ukrainians, but also a significant number of minorities, such as Jews and Azeries, and which fought primarily against Soviet and German police and military forces and Soviet and Polish partisans (see Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, “Anti-Soviet Partisans”).

This article examines the question as to whether leaders and members of the OUN-B and the UPA were involved in the Nazi-led genocide of Jews, Ukrainians, Poles, and Russians in Ukraine. The article analyzes the biographies of OUN-B and UPA leaders, historical studies, and archival data to examine this issue. A specific focus is on Volhynia (contemporary Volyn and Rivne Regions and a North-Western part of the Ternopil Region), where the UPA was founded by the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in the spring of 1943. The

study deals primarily with the OUN-B because it was historically more influential than the Andrii Melnyk faction (OUN-M), in particular, by organizing the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and because the policies of the heroization of the OUN in “Orange” Ukraine concerned mainly the Bandera faction.

The study analyses the biographies of 119 top-ranked and 210 middle-ranked OUN-B leaders and UPA commanders in Ukraine (Sodol). Because data about their real names, activities, and fates, in many instances, especially in cases of middle-ranked members, are incomplete or uncertain, biographical information from other sources, such as *Litopys UPA*, memoirs and testimonies of former OUN and UPA leaders, various historical studies, and archival documents, was also used in this analysis in order to fill in the gaps as much as possible. It was not possible in all instances to cite all analyzed sources because of space limitations. The analysis excludes non-OUN and non-UPA members of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council, which was created in the middle of 1944 and played a largely ceremonial role. This study also analyzes documents concerning the OUN and the UPA, local police, and Nazi genocide from the State Archive of the Volyn Region (DAVO), the State Archive of the Rivne Region (DARO), the Archive of the State Security Service of Ukraine in the Volyn Region (USBU), the Archive of the State Security Service of Ukraine (HDA SBU), the National Archives in the US, and other archives.

Previous Studies

There is a growing number of academic studies about the OUN and the UPA not only in Ukraine, but also in the West, Poland, and Russia. These studies often embrace differing views of these organizations. Many issues, in particular the involvement of the OUN and the UPA in

Nazi-led genocide, still remain debated or not sufficiently researched (see Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, “Anti-Soviet Partisans;” *Orhanizatsia*; Rudling, “The OUN”).

Research on the OUN and the UPA in the Soviet Union was restricted, censored, and often driven by the communist ideology, which depicted these organizations as “bourgeois nationalists” and close allies of Nazi Germany. However, for similar reasons, the issue of the OUN-UPA’s involvement in the genocide of Jews and the ethnic cleansing of Poles was largely ignored in the Soviet Union. For example, for such propaganda purposes, the Nachtigall battalion commanded by Shukhevych was accused of perpetrating the killings of thousands of residents in Lviv. However, there is evidence of participation by individual members of this battalion in the Lviv pogrom and executions by the Nachtigall battalion of Jews in two villages near Vinnytsia (Himka, “The Lviv Pogrom;” *Sprava* 57, 17). Some recent studies make similar undocumented claims about the Nachtigall and maintain that the UPA was created by the German military intelligence (Abwehr) and that the UPA leaders were active Abwehr agents (see, for instance, Voitsekhovsky, Dygas, and Tkachenko, 2006).

While Western scholarship about the OUN and the UPA was more open and relatively more balanced, it was also affected by the Cold War politics. Western studies, particularly by Ukrainian diaspora scholars, frequently minimized or ignored the OUN’s and UPA’s involvement in mass murder. They often relied on OUN sources in the West, while ignoring or discounting Soviet sources as unreliable (see, for example, Armstrong). The American, British, and West German governments provided refuge to many OUN and UPA leaders and members after the end of World War II, and the governments of these countries often withheld or did not properly investigate information about their involvement in the mass killings in Ukraine. American and British intelligence agencies used many OUN and UPA leaders in exile for

intelligence and propaganda purposes against the Soviet Union, and they aided the UPA underground in Soviet Ukraine in the end of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s (see Breitman, Goda, Naftali, and Wolf).

Publications produced by former leaders and members of the OUN and the UPA and their followers in the West generally presented these organizations as a movement for the independence of Ukraine while minimizing or ignoring their participation in the mass murders (see, for example, *Litopys Ukrainskoi*). Similar approaches were adopted by many historians of the OUN and the UPA in post-Soviet Ukraine. They often uncritically relied on documents or memoirs produced by OUN and UPA leaders and members, who had a vested interest in presenting favorable histories of their organizations. In contrast, Ukrainian, American, Jewish, Polish, and Russian archival documents and testimonies were often marginalized or used selectively (see, for example, *Litopys UPA*).

The analysis of ideology and policy of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which split into the Bandera faction and the Melnyk faction in 1940, primarily because of tactical and leadership differences, shows that it was a semi-totalitarian organization that combined elements of extreme nationalism and fascism. Although the OUN-B formally declared independent Ukraine run as a dictatorship as its ultimate goal, the reliance on collaboration with Nazi Germany in the beginning of the war meant that OUN-B leaders in practice pursued the creation of a quasi-independent Ukrainian state that would be similar to *Ustashi* Croatia or Slovakia, would be allied with Nazi Germany, or would be its protectorate (*OUN; Ukrainskie*, Vol. 2, 79). However, Adolf Hitler and the Nazi leadership refused to accept such quasi-independent Ukrainian state because they regarded Ukraine as a place for German colonization and planned to exterminate, exile to Siberia, or use as slave labor most Ukrainians, whom they regarded as

racially inferior (Katchanovski, “The Politics”). The OUN-B viewed Jews, Poles, and Russians as hostile minorities (see Berkhoff and Carynyk; Rudling, “The OUN”). Although its official ideology abandoned many of the extreme elements since 1943, the actual policies of the OUN-B did not change to the same extent. For example, the UPA in 1943 undertook an ethnic cleansing campaign against Poles in Volhynia, and the OUN-UPA relied on attacks against suspected pro-Soviet civilians who were their main casualties in 1944–1954 (*Politychnyi*, 770–71).

The OUN and the UPA can both be classified as terrorist organizations because their actions correspond to academic definitions of terrorism as the use of violence against civilians by non-state actors in order to intimidate and to achieve political goals. There is also evidence of the involvement of the OUN in international terrorism, in particular, a reported Nazi-led plot to assassinate U.S. President Roosevelt in 1940–41 and OUN’s assistance to Croatian *Ustashi* in the assassination of the King of Yugoslavia in France in 1934 (Case 800.20211; Henry Field Papers).

Some studies conclude that the OUN-B and the local militia that it formed helped to organize anti-Jewish pogroms in a large number of Western Ukrainian towns and cities in the summer of 1941 (Brandon and Lower; Himka, “The Lviv Pogrom;” Pohl; Spector). The overall casualties of these pogroms are estimated as ranging between 13,000 and 35,000 (Pohl 306). However, the analysis of Einsatzgruppen reports and eyewitness testimonies indicates that these casualties are likely to be overstated by an order of magnitude. Many of them were victims not of local pogroms itself but of Nazi-led executions, which coincided with pogroms but were carried out with the help of the OUN militia or by the militia itself on German orders. This includes the biggest pogroms, such as Lviv, Ternopil, Kremianets, Zolochiv, and Zboriv. For instance, Einsatzgruppen reports, the trials of their leaders, and a comprehensive study of the Lviv pogrom

on July 1, 1941 indicates that the absolute majority of several thousand people, primarily Jews but also Poles and Ukrainians, who were killed in Lviv in the beginning of July 1941, were executed by the German squads with the assistance of OUN-B-organized militia during several days following this pogrom (Himka, “The Lviv Pogrom;” Kruglov, 132–133, 151–153).

Previous studies show that the militia organized by OUN-B marching groups and their local leaders assisted in the mass executions of more than 50,000 Jews, Soviet activists and POWs, and Poles by the Einsatzgruppen and other German formations in summer 1941 (Katchanovski, “OUN(b)”). In addition, the UPA, which was established after the absolute majority of Jews in Ukraine were already exterminated during the Nazi genocide, killed on its own at least a thousand of Jews who had survived the Nazi-led mass murder (Himka, “The Ukrainian”).

The analysis of previous studies shows that a very small number of Jews served in the UPA and they primarily had secondary capacities such as doctors. Their presence was motivated mainly by instrumental reasons as they tried to escape the Nazi genocide, while the UPA used them because it needed medical and other such services that could not be provided by the Ukrainians. A large proportion of these Jews were killed later by the UPA (see Himka, “The Ukrainian;” Spector).

A growing number of studies concern the Nazi genocide in Ukraine. They mostly focus on the genocide of Jews in Nazi-occupied Ukraine. The Nazi mass murder of the Jews was the most comprehensive and recognized case of genocide. It intended to eliminate the entire Jewish population in Ukraine and other Nazi-occupied territories. This plan resulted in the mass murder of the absolute majority of the Jews in these lands, and it was only stopped in its final stages by the military defeat of Nazi Germany, primarily by the Red Army, which included several

millions Ukrainians. About 1.4 million Jews were killed in Ukraine as a result of the Nazi genocide (Brandon and Lower, 11). Many previous studies explicitly or implicitly attribute the mass murder of Jews during the Nazi genocide to the Ukrainians or the local Ukrainian population. The Ukrainians are referred to as perpetrators of the mass murders or as supporters of the OUN, the UPA, and the Ukrainian auxiliary police (see, for instance, Spector). However, only a small number of studies have specifically examined the role of the Ukrainian militia and the auxiliary police in the mass murders of Jews (see, for example, Dean). The overall extent of the OUN and the UPA links to the militia and the police and their leaders and members involvement in the genocide of Jews remain largely undetermined.

There is a lack of studies of the role of the OUN and the UPA in the Nazi genocide of the Ukrainians, Poles, Russians, Belarusians, and Gypsies (Roma). Nazi genocidal policy envisioned, and partly succeeded in a physical elimination of a significant part of these Slavic peoples and Gypsies. The overwhelming majority of the estimated 27 million of people who died during World War II in the Soviet Union, including about seven million in Ukraine, perished as a result of the Nazi's genocidal policy that relied not only on the mass killing of civilians and POWs, but also on the deliberate creation of conditions that resulted in their death from the deprivation of food, shelter, and medical care (see Katchanovski, "The Politics;" Vallin, Mesle, Adamets, and Pyrozhkov).

Previous studies note a desertion of about 4,000–6,000 members of the auxiliary police formations on an OUN order to the UPA in Volhynia in March through April 1943 (*Litopys UPA*, Vol. 2 xii; Dean, 145). However, the role of these UPA members in the Nazi-led genocide during their service in the police is often ignored or minimized by many Ukrainian historians. For example, Patryliak (2006) maintains that 16% out of 1,445 UPA members in the "Bohun"

military district as of the beginning of 1944 previously served in German police and military formations, even though their personnel files contained a specific entry only about previous service and rank in “foreign armies,” and most of ex-policemen were not required to list their service in police formations. In addition to equating the lack of specific information about such police service with its absence, they also do this indirectly by inflating the total membership of the UPA; for example, by uncritically citing German and Soviet estimates or post-war OUN publications, which often put the UPA membership at around 100,000 or even more (see Sodal Vol, 1, 46–47).

One can estimate on the basis of information reported by top commanders of the UPA that its maximal membership was 19,000–22,000. The data provided by UPA commanders concerning strength of their units is much more reliable than German or Soviet military and intelligence estimates or estimates made by historians and the OUN and UPA exiles in the West. A detailed description of the strength of UPA units in documents seized by the Soviet security forces from Dmytro Klyachkivsky, the commander of the UPA-North, shows that the maximum strength of the UPA-North and the UPA-South reached about 7,000 by April 1944. Afterwards, the Soviet advance swiftly decimated their numbers, which dropped to 2,600 by September 1944 (*Litopys UPA*, Vol. 14, 71–79).⁴ Oleksander Lutsky testified that the strength of the UPA-West, which he organized and commanded at first, reached 12,000–15,000 by March 1944 (*Litopys UPA*, Vol. 9, 341).

Some studies argue that the mass murder of Poles committed by the UPA constituted genocide (see, for example, Siemaszko and Siemaszko). However, the mass murder of Poles in Volhynia by the UPA cannot be classified as genocide because there is no evidence of the intent of the OUN and the UPA to eliminate entire or a significant part of the Polish nation, and their

anti-Polish actions were mostly limited to a relatively small region of Ukraine. The UPA conducted a campaign of mass terror against the Polish minority in Volhynia in 1943 and, to a lesser extent, in Galicia in 1944 with an aim of ethnic cleansing.

Some studies estimate Polish casualties of the OUN and the UPA at some 130,000, including 40,000–60,000 in Volhynia (Hrytsiuk 262; Siemaszko 94). However, these estimates are inflated because of the unwarranted extrapolation of the casualties from the known locations of the mass murders of Poles to locations where information about murders of Poles is lacking, or where no Poles or very small number of them lived. The Polish casualty numbers are also inflated because of the inclusion of victims of other nationalist formations, the Ukrainian police, SS Galicia Division, unidentified “Ukrainians,” and even pro-Soviet militia, or unjustified assumptions about the scale of the movement of Poles and the losses of the Polish population attributed to the Nazi’s genocidal policies. A more reliable preliminary estimate of 35,000 casualties in Volhynia is derived on the basis of both documented casualties, adjusted to exclude casualties that are not linked to actions of the UPA in 1943–1944, and demographic changes of the Polish population adjusted for undercounting excessive deaths and other losses linked to German genocidal policies and the number of Poles drafted into the Polish Army in 1944–45 (Hrytsiuk 258–68; Siemaszko and Siemaszko 1045–57; Sprava 12 TsDAVO). Although a significant proportion (at least 10%) of the ethnic Poles in Volhynia was killed by the UPA, the Polish casualties comprised about 1% of the prewar population of Poles in territories where the UPA was active and 0.2% of the entire ethnically Polish population in Ukraine and Poland.

The OUN, the UPA, and the Nazi Genocide

The analysis of 119 biographies of the top echelon of OUN-B and UPA leaders in Ukraine shows that at least 63% of them served in the regional and local police, militia, and administration, the Nachtigall and Roland Battalions, Bergbauern-Hilfe (the Sushko Legion), the SS Galicia Division, studied in German or German-sponsored military and intelligence schools, or collaborated in various capacities with intelligence and security agencies of Nazi Germany, primarily at the beginning of World War II. At least 34% of the OUN-B and UPA leaders were in the auxiliary police, militia, the Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201, and other police and quasi-police formations, 29% in intelligence, military, and security schools in Germany and Nazi-occupied Poland, 12% in the regional and local administration in Ukraine during the Nazi occupation, 12% in the Nachtigall and Roland Battalions, 3% in the SS Galicia Division and other German and allied military formations, and 1% in Bergbauern-Hilfe (Table 1).

[Table 1 about here]

German, OUN-B, and Soviet archival documents, testimonies, and historical studies indicate that a minimum of 28% of the top leaders of the OUN-B and the UPA worked for, or collaborated in other ways with, the German intelligence and security agencies, primarily the Abwehr, and to a lesser extent, the I-C (1 C) and Gestapo. Adding in the participation in intelligence and security services schools; Bergbauern-Hilfe, which was organized by Abwehr and the OUN for use in the war against Poland; and Nachtigall and Roland Battalions, which were organized by Abwehr and the OUN-B for use in the war against the Soviet Union, at least 42% of the top leadership of the OUN-UPA, including 48% of the commanders in the UPA, collaborated formally or informally with the German intelligence and security services. Similar evidence indicates that such collaboration with intelligence and security agencies of Nazi Germany was typically sanctioned by the OUN and UPA leadership, and it involved intelligence-

gathering, sabotage, and other such activities against Poland and the Soviet Union. The organizational collaboration of the OUN-B with the German security and intelligence agencies took place primarily from the 1930s until the end of the summer of 1941, when these agencies started mass arrests of OUN-B leaders and members. It resumed to a significant extent since the beginning of 1944 following negotiations of OUN-B and UPA leaders in Ukraine with representatives of Abwehr, I-C, the Security Police (SiPo) and the Security Service (SD), and terminated only with the defeat of Nazi Germany. There is evidence that chief OUN-B and UPA leaders, such as Stepan Bandera, Mykola Lebed, Yaroslav Stetsko, Roman Shukhevych, Dmytro Kliachivsky, and Vasyl Kuk, were involved in organizing or personally carrying out this collaboration in the beginning and in the end of the war. (Case 800.20211; Henry Field Papers; *Litopys Ukrainskoi*, Vol. 27, 180–236; *OUN*, 241–243, 317, 426–427; *Sprava 372*, Vol. 001, 034, 035, 057; *Ukrainskie*).

The analysis of 210 biographies of mostly middle-rank OUN-B and UPA leaders in Ukraine, such as commanders of regiments (*zahins*), battalions (*kurins*), and companies (*sotni*); members of command and staff of military districts; and commanders of training schools, the Security Service (SB), and the medical service; and regional leaders of security, propaganda, female, and other sections of the OUN-B, produces a similar pattern. Almost half (49%) of them collaborated with Germany and its Axis allies in occupied Ukraine, Poland, and Belarus. Specifically, a minimum of 35% of them were in the police/militia, the Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201, and other police formations, 20% in the Nachtigall and Roland Battalions and Bergbauern-Hilfe, 8% in intelligence, military, and security schools, 7% in the SS Galicia Division and other German military formations, and 4% in the local and regional administration. In addition, at least 4% collaborated with Abwehr or Romanian intelligence. (Table 1).

The percentages of Nazi collaborators among the OUN-B and UPA leadership are likely to be higher since information concerning their activities at the beginning of the war is not available in many cases. A large numbers of them were in OUN-B marching groups, which organized militia and administration mainly in Western Ukraine in the summer of 1941.

This biographical analysis shows that the UPA was controlled by the Bandera faction of the OUN. At least 90% of the top commanders of the UPA, including its security and medical services, were members of the OUN-B or its youth branch, while 1% belonged to the OUN-M prior to joining the UPA. At least 56% of middle-ranked UPA commanders belonged to the OUN-B or its youth wing, and 4% were former members of the Melnyk faction. The extent of the OUN-B control of the UPA is likely to be larger, since the information concerning the party memberships of the 4% of its top echelon and 27% of its middle-ranked command are not available.

The upper OUN-B and UPA leadership was comprised of 71% Galicians, 20% Volhynians, 6% from the historically Eastern Ukraine, and 1% from Bukovyna. The middle echelon included 53% from Galicia, 17% Volhynia, 5% historically Eastern Ukraine, 2% Transcarpathia, and 1% Bukovyna, while the birthplace region of 19% is unknown. The analysis identified 0.3% non-Ukrainians, in particular, no Jews among the 329 top- and middle-ranked OUN and UPA leaders. The single non-ethnic Ukrainian was an Azeri middle-ranked UPA commander, who defected to the UPA-North along with some 160 other Azeris from a police formation (Sodol Vol. 2, 107–08).

A minimum of 74% of the top- and 58% of middle-ranked UPA commanders collaborated with Nazi Germany.⁵ Close to half (49%) of the top-ranked and 42% of the middle-ranked members of the UPA had prior service in police or militia during the German occupation

(see Table 1). Former policemen, who served in various police or militia formations in Nazi-occupied Ukraine, Poland, and Belarus, occupied, at various times, the following top positions in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army: the supreme commander and the chief of the general staff of the UPA, commanders or chiefs of staffs of all three areas (the UPA-North, the UPA-West, and the UPA-South), and commanders or chiefs of staff of at least 10 out of 11 military districts (calculated from Sodol and other sources). At least 62% of the commanders of military battalions and companies in the UPA-North and the UPA-South as of 1944 were Nazi collaborators earlier, including 54% who served in police formations. (calculated from *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 14, 71–79 and other sources).

A large number of the top commanders of the UPA served in the Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201 from the end of 1941 until the end of 1942. For example, the former officers of this police battalion included Roman Shukhevych, Oleksander Lutsky, and Vasyl Sydor. Shukhevych was one of the leaders of the OUN-B after the OUN split in 1940 and the supreme commander of the UPA from 1943 until he was killed by the Soviet security forces in 1950. Oleksander Lutsky organized and became the first commander of the UPA-West, which was based mainly in Galicia. Vasyl Sydor served as the commander of UPA-West in 1944–49.

Even though this question has not yet been addressed by specific studies, there is a strong likelihood that the Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201 was involved in the implementation of the Nazi genocide of Jews and Belarusians during the war. Such mobile police units participated in the mass executions of Jews, Belarusians, and Ukrainians (see Dean; Klymenko and Tkachov; Rudling, “Szkolenie”). The highly disproportionate number of Soviet partisans that the Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201 reportedly killed in Belarus (more than 2,000) compared to its

own losses (49) indicates that the absolute majority of the partisans were civilians murdered under the pretext of anti-partisan operations (Rudling, “Szkolenie”).

Many top regional commanders of the UPA and regional leaders of the OUN-B served as militia or police commanders in the Nazi-occupied Ukraine. For example, Mykola Kovtoniuk (Yakymchuk), the commandant of the Lutsk city militia in the summer of 1941 and an OUN-B leader in the Volyn Region, became the first commander of the “Turiv” district of the UPA-North. (Sprava 1). Omelian Hrabets, the leader of the OUN-B in the Rivne Region in 1941–42 and the commander of the UPA-South in 1943–44, headed the regional militia in Rivne in the summer of 1941 (*Litopys UPA*, Vol. 9, 702, 775). Archival documents and eyewitness reports indicate that the OUN-controlled militia assisted in the mass executions in these two largest Volhynian towns in the summer of 1941, and that at least 1,500 people were killed, primarily Jews and significant numbers of Ukrainians, Russians, and Poles (see Katchanovski, “OUN(b);” Spector 73–76). Similarly, Stepan Yanishevsky, a deputy commander of the police in Vinnytsia in 1941–43, became the acting head of the “Zahrava” district of the UPA-North (Sodol Vol. 1, 136).

A significant number of former police commanders occupied leading positions in the SB OUN-B, which also served as the security services of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. For example, Yaroslav Diakon, the head of the SB in the Lviv Region in 1942–44 and the acting head of the SB OUN-B in 1947–48, commanded the auxiliary police in the town of Bobrki in the Lviv Region and took part in the mass executions of Jews in this town in April 1943 (see Burds 97–98). Panas Kovalchuk, a commander of the police in the town of Torchyn in the Volyn Region, participated in the mass executions of more than 3,000 Jews and a large number of Ukrainians in 1941–42, and then he became the head of the SB in the Volyn Region in 1943–44

and the head of the SB of the North-Western area of Ukraine in 1948–49 (Hurtovyi 153–58; Sodol Vol. 1, 87).

Simultaneous and coordinated mass defections of the auxiliary police units across Volhynia on OUN-B orders and subsequent joining in the UPA by the absolute majority of them indicate that the Bandera faction exercised de-facto control over a significant part of the police in Volhynia. For example, analyses of OUN-B reports, archival documents, eyewitness interviews, historical studies, and Soviet reports indicate that a significant proportion, or all policemen and/or their commanders from 95% of 62 regional and district centers that existed on January 1943 on the territory of the former Volhynian Voivodeship (the Volyn Region, the Rivne Region, and the Kremenets area) had abandoned their service in 1943 and joined the UPA. Such information concerning the 5% of small district centers (Ludvypol (Sosnove), Radyvyliv, and Sedlyshche) are lacking.

Nearly entire Schutzmannschaft battalion 103 and significant percentages of officers and members of Schutzmannschaft battalions 101, 102, 104, 105, 109, 114, and 201 joined the UPA, primarily from the spring of 1943 until the end of the year (see, for example, Bolianovsky, *Ukrainski*; Dereiko 92; Klymenko and Tkachov). Each of these battalions included several hundred servicemen. Mass desertions to the UPA in 1943 included other police formations, such as railroad police in the Kovel area and about 300 members of the agricultural police school, which was formed on the basis of a militia school that was created by the OUN-B in Lutsk in the summer of 1941 (Sprava 75175 FP). OUN-B and UPA reports indicate that they were joined by at least several hundred policemen from Central and Eastern Ukraine, plus at least a few hundred members of the police formations created from national minorities among Soviet POWs, such as Azeries. Many members of the Taras Borovets (“Taras Bulba”) and the OUN-M armed

formations, which were incorporated into the UPA by force, served in militia/police units controlled by Borovets and the OUN-M. In the summer of 1941, Borovets organized with German approval “Poliska Sich,” which served as a militia. Its members assisted in the mass execution of the Jews, for instance, in Olevsk (McBride and Kruglov 1554). Borovets turned a part of his militia in 1942 into a nationalist partisan formation that was initially called the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), while its other part joined the auxiliary police (Bulba-Borovets).

Comprehensive analyses of historical studies, and testimonies of archival documents, publications, and testimonies concerning all district centers and main towns, as well as police battalions and schools in Volhynia and the defections of specific police formations and commanders to the UPA indicates that some 6,000-8,000 former policemen and militiamen joined the UPA on OUN-B orders there in 1943. The total comprised more than half of all UPA members at least until the end of 1943. In the UPA-North and the UPA-South, the former policemen constituted the absolute majority at least until the beginning of 1944. As noted, the UPA-North and the UPA-South units included about 7,000 members by the time of the Soviet advance in January–February 1944 (*Litopys UPA*, Vol. 14, 71–79). The UPA-West was established in December 1943 on the basis of the Ukrainian People’s Self-Defense (UNS), which was organized by the OUN-B in Galicia in the summer of 1943 to counter a raid by a large Soviet partisans unit led by Sydir Kovpak, and transformed into the UPA-West in December 1943. According to the testimony of Lutsky, the organizer of the UNS, he had about 2,000 members under his command in August 1943 and 5,000 to 6,000 members by December 1943. Most of UNS top commanders, including Lutsky, served as police commanders under the Germans during the war (*Litopys UPA*, Vol. 9, 336–339).

There are estimates that from 1,000 to 3,000 members of the SS Galicia division, many of whom served previously in various auxiliary police formations, joined the UPA, primarily the UPA-West. At least a couple of hundred members of the 4th and 5th Galician regiments, which initially fulfilled police functions under SS command and later were incorporated into regular units of the SS Galicia Division, also deserted to the UPA (Bolianovsky, *Dyviziia* 216–24, 241–54). These formations participated in the mass executions of close to 1,000 Polish residents of Huta Pieniacka with assistance from UPA units and other massacres of Polish civilians (Rudling, “They Defended”). The-ex police members likely still constituted a significant proportion of the UPA members until the early fall of 1944 when the combined strength of UPA-North and the UPA-South units declined to 2,600 as a result of Soviet anti-UPA actions, and the UPA-West became the main force of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

The estimate of the numeric role of the ex-police members in the UPA is made on the basis of an absence of its large-scale losses against German forces, forces of their Axis allies and auxiliaries, and the Polish underground formations, such as the Armia Krajowa (AK). Although two small OUN-B units existed in Volhynia from the end of 1942, the first significant attacks against German forces and Polish civilians were launched in February of 1943. These two OUN-B armed formations were organized and led by commanders who previously served in militia or police (Serhii Kachynsky and Hryts Perehyniak). Kachynsky was one of the organizers and commanders of a militia school in Rivne in the summer of 1941 along with Leonid Stupnytski, who became the chief of staff of the UPA-North (Sodol, Vol. 1, 125, Vol. 2, 38–39, 76). The school also fulfilled the functions of militia, which assisted in the Nazi-led mass executions in Rivne (Katchanovski, “OUN(b)"). Kachynsky’s unit formation has been often misrepresented by

OUN-B and UPA leaders after World War II and commemorated by nationalist politicians in contemporary Ukraine, as the creation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army on October 14, 1942.

Many of the anti-German attacks attributed to the UPA coincided with the mass defections of the Ukrainian auxiliary police in Volhynia in March–April 1943. Many locations in Volhynia, in particular an area around a town of Kolky, came under control of the UPA as a result of these mass defections (Sprava 12).

Analyses of biographies of the OUN-B and the UPA leaders show that the anti-German activities of the UPA and the Bandera faction of the OUN were relatively minor, especially compared to the anti-Soviet activity. The leaders of the OUN-B and the UPA in Ukraine had much fewer chances to perish due to German actions and policies than the average adult Ukrainian (Vallin, Mesle, Adamets, and Pyrozhkov). For example, at most, 6% of the top OUN-B and UPA leaders in Ukraine, in particular 3% of the top UPA commanders, died as result of German actions. In comparison, 54% of their upper-echelon leadership, including 55% UPA commanders, perished as result of actions of Soviet security and military forces and their Polish, Czechoslovak, and East German allies. In addition, 20% of top OUN-B and UPA leaders were arrested and executed, died in detention, or sentenced in the Soviet Union and its East Central European allies, and 10% escaped to the West. None were prosecuted in Western countries, and some, such as Mykola Lebed, who headed the OUN-B in Ukraine in 1941-43, were used by Western intelligence services, in particular the CIA, during the Cold War with the Soviet Union (see Breitman, Goda, Naftali, and Wolfe).

Similarly, 9% of the 210 middle-ranked OUN-B and UPA leaders, in particular 5% of the UPA commanders, were killed by German forces, their Axis allies, or local Ukrainian and Polish auxiliary police. In many of these cases, the role of their affiliation with the OUN and UPA in

their death is unclear. For example, many of them were killed in 1944 during their attempts to cross the German-Soviet frontline, during arrest attempts, or in cross-fire. Some perished during random arrests and executions or were confused with Soviet partisans and Soviet underground members who were active in the same areas. Conversely, at least 41% of the middle-ranked OUN-B and UPA leaders, specifically 43% of the UPA commanders, were killed or committed suicide as a result of Soviet actions or the actions of its Polish, Czechoslovak, or Romanian allies. In addition, at least 14% were arrested and executed or sentenced in the Soviet Union and its allies. At least 6% of the total number of middle-ranked OUN-B and UPA leaders, including 6% of UPA commanders, perished at the hands of the SB or were killed by fellow UPA members, mostly as suspected Soviet agents, even though declassified Soviet documents confirm that only one of them was a Soviet agent.

At the same time, at least 32% of the top-ranked OUN-B and UPA leaders in Ukraine were arrested, taken as prisoners, or interned at various times during the war by the German security forces, police, military, and other occupational authorities of Germany and Hungary. However, it is striking that all of them, with the exception of Ivan Klymiv, were either released relatively soon or escaped—many more than once. Similarly, Bandera and the absolute majority of other top leaders of the OUN who were arrested or detained by the Nazis outside of Ukraine were not murdered. They were released by the Nazi authorities by the end of the war, in contrast to the majority of Jewish prisoners and Soviet POWs. This pattern is analogous among the middle-ranked leadership of the UPA and the OUN-B. At least 16% of them were arrested by the German police, military, or by the Hungarian and Romanian allies of Nazi Germany, but the absolute majority of them (at least 82%) were released or escaped.

Historical studies and archival documents show that police and militia formations, whose commanders or significant proportions of members following the OUN-B orders deserted and joined the UPA, participated in implementing Nazi genocidal policies before they switched their formal allegiance. Local Ukrainian police and militia commanders and members assisted in conducting the Nazi genocide of the Jews by rounding up the Jews and guarding them during the mass executions, catching and executing escapees and survivors, guarding Jewish ghettos, and in some cases carrying out mass executions of Jews (see, for example, Brandon and Lower; Megargee and Dean; Spector).

Analyses of archival documents, OUN-B reports, eyewitness interviews, historical studies, and Soviet documents indicate that police and militia commanders and/or significant proportion of police members up to the entire number before joining the UPA served in such capacity in the absolute majority of cities, towns, and district centers in Volhynia during the time period of the mass annihilation of the Jews by the Nazis, and they assisted in the implementation of the mass murders there. Since the participation of individual police and militia commanders and units in specific acts of mass murder is not always possible to establish, the total number of the Jews who lived at the beginning of the German occupation or were executed in these locations from June 1941 until the spring of 1943 provides the maximum estimate of the numbers of Jews killed by the Nazis with assistance of the OUN-B and UPA leaders and members. Approximate numbers of the Jews who were executed or killed by other means with the help of local police or militia in the biggest of the cities, towns, and district centers, in which OUN-B and UPA members commanded the local police or militia formations or in which significant proportions of the policemen defected to the UPA, were as follows: 22,000–23,000 in Rivne; 19,000 in Lutsk and Volodymyr-Volynskyi; 15,000–18,000 in Kovel; 14,000 in Sarny;

9,000–13,000 in Dubno; 8,000 in Kremenets; 6,500–10,500 in Ostroh; 5,000 in Korets; 4,500 in Kostopil; 4,000 in Rozhyshe; 3,500 in Kamin-Kashyrskiy; 3,000–4,000 in Luboml and Horokhiv; 3,000 in Berestechko, Berezno, Torchyn, Tuchyn, and Ustyluh; 2,500–3,000 in Vyshnevets; 2,500 in Olyka, Matsiiv (Lukiv), Rafalivka, and Ratno; 2,000–3,000 in Mezhyrich; 2,000–2,500 in Manevychi; 2,000 in Kolky, Lanivtsi, Mizoch, Shumsk, and Volodymyrets; 1,500 in Lokachi, Mlyniv, Oleksandriia, Porytsk (Staryi Porytsk), Turiisk, and Vysotsk; 1,000–1,500 in Klevan; 1,000 in Hoschsha and Pochaiv; 900 in Ozutychi; 750 in Ostrozhets; 700 in Demydivka, and 300 in Kivertsi (Megargee and Dean; Spector 362–64).

In Volhynia, the Jews accounted for more than 200,000 among the estimated 400,000–500,000 victims of the Nazi genocide among the local population, which consisted of mostly Ukrainians and Poles, and among Soviet POWs, who mostly included Russians and Ukrainians. (Hrytsiuk). An estimated 48,000 Soviet POWs were executed or perished in POW camps in the Volyn Region, including 25,000 in Volodymyr-Volynskiy, 12,000 in Kovel, and 10,500 out of 14,000 in Lutsk from deliberately created conditions that involved hunger, diseases, and hard work. In the Rivne Region, 68,000 POWs were killed, including 30,000 in Rivne, and in POW camps in Dubno, Ostroh, Kostopil, and Korets. (*Dovidnyk*; Sprava 16 2–3).

Although the issue is still not well researched, archival documents indicate that the local militia and police forces that served in Volhynian towns with POWs camps and joined the UPA in 1943 were used in 1941–43 in capturing, transporting, and guarding the Soviet POWs and assisting in their mass executions. For example, the archival militia documents show that the militia in Lutsk under the command of Kovtoniuk (Yakymchuk) and other OUN-B leaders during the summer of 1941 captured and handed over many Soviet POWs, including Ukrainians, to the German police (Sprava 1). An archival document of the German occupational

administration shows that the Ukrainian auxiliary police was used for guarding POWs at Stalag 360 in Lutsk (Sprava 2 58). The militia in the Kremenets area fulfilled similar functions (Klymenko and Tkachov 70).

Even though two factions of the OUN were often acting as rivals and resorted to killing their counterparts from other factions, many OUN-M leaders, who served as police commanders and were likely involved in the mass murder of Jews and Ukrainians, were given commanding positions after they joined the UPA. For example, Ivan Kediulych, one of OUN-M leaders in Western Ukraine, became a commander of a territorial unit in the UPA-West (Sodol Vol. 2, 39). In the fall of 1941, he and other OUN-M leaders were the organizers and commanders of the Kyiv Kurin and the city police in Nazi-occupied Kyiv. There were other OUN-M members who served in the police or OUN-M marching groups, in particular, in the Bukovynian Kurin that organized local police, and who later joined the UPA (*Litopys UPA*, Vol. 19). First OUN-M organizers of Kyiv police and some units under their command arrived in Kyiv before the execution of 34,000 Jews in Babyn Yar (Babi Yar) in the end of September 1941 (Sprava 69330 FP). There is evidence of the involvement of these police units in this and other mass executions of Jews and Ukrainian and Russian civilians and POWs in Babyn Yar and other locations in Kyiv City (see Berkhoff).

Similarly, the auxiliary police and its commanders before their desertion to the UPA, helped to implement a Nazi genocidal policy of extermination of a large proportion of Ukrainians by means of mass executions and the deliberate creation of such conditions as starvation, hard psychological work, burning of dwellings, and deprivation of medical care with an intent to destroy a significant part of this Slavic people who were regarded by Adolf Hitler as racially inferior (see Katchanovski, "The Politics"). Local police in Ukraine, in particular

Volhynia, assisted Nazi occupational authorities in the mass killings of residents of entire villages, numerous executions of civilian hostages and people hiding Jews and Soviet POWs or breaking numerous other laws and regulations that were punished with death, such as violating strict curfews, traveling without permits, and keeping radios and pigeons. The police rounded up people for forced labor, burned villages, and confiscated food that resulted in death of a significant number of Ukrainians from cold and hunger and diseases that spread because of policies carried out by Nazi Germany in the occupied Ukraine. (See, for instance, Berkhoff).

For example, there is evidence that police from Ratno, Kovel, Kamin-Kashyrskyi, and Zabolottia, along with a company of the Schutzmannschaft Battalion 103, assisted in the mass executions of close to 3,000 Ukrainians, mainly children and women, in the village of Kortelisy and the neighboring hamlets in the Volyn Region in September 1942 (Sprava 229, 17–18; Sprava 67454, Vol. 32, 254; McBride, forthcoming). In the spring of 1943, the entire units or significant factions of the police from all these locations joined the UPA (Antoniuk 25). It is noteworthy that at least seven ex-commanding officers and policemen from these units were appointed as commanders of *kurins* and *sotnis*, while at least four others occupied other commanding positions in the UPA, including the SB. They comprised a significant fraction of the top command of the “Turiv” district that included the whole Volyn Region (calculated from Antoniuk 25, 170; *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 14, 65–68, and other sources). Their police service and evidence from testimonies and post-war trials indicate that they were either personally involved, likely involved, or bore responsibility as superiors of their police units in this Nazi-led mass murder of Ukrainians in Kortelisy (Sprava 229, 17–18; Sprava 67454, Vol. 32, 254; McBride, forthcoming; Nakonechnyi 60). Similarly, the auxiliary police from Tsuman, most of whom joined the UPA in 1943, helped to carry out the mass executions of more than 130 residents,

primarily women and children, in the Ukrainian village of Klubochyn and about 50 people in the Polish settlement of Oborky in November 1942 (Sprava 4).

In addition to the Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201, other police battalions, such as 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 109, and 114, whose most members or a significant part of members joined the UPA, participated in Ukraine and Belarus in the mass killings of Jews and anti-partisan operations, which often involved the mass executions of Ukrainian and Belarusian civilians (Bolianovsky, *Ukrainski* 138–139, 148; Dereiko 105; Klymenko and Tkachov). For instance, German reports and Soviet trials of Ukrainian policemen from Schutzmannschaft Battalion 103 reveal that this police unit participated in the mass executions of Jews in Matsiiv, Volodymyr-Volynskyi, Berestechko, Lokachi, and Turiisk (Nakonechnyi 23, 46; Kruglov 390).

Many of OUN-B leaders and members, who collaborated with German intelligence and security services, primarily until the end of the summer of 1941, were likely involved in the Nazi-led mass murder. For example, documents from Ukrainian, German, Russian, and US archives indicate various kinds of collaboration, mostly in 1939-41 of a significant number of OUN-B leaders with Gestapo, which became a part of the SiPo and SD since the end of the 1930s (Breitman, Goda, Naftali, and Wolf 249, 452; Case 800.20211; Henry Field Papers; Sprava 372, Vol. 001, 034, 035, 057; *Ukrainskie*). There is evidence that Lebed, who organized and headed the SB in 1940-41, Shukhevych, and many top SB commanders attended a Gestapo School in Zakopane in 1939-40, but identities and specific activities of most of the school graduates require more research (Berkhoff 289, 298; Breitman, Goda, Naftali, and Wolf 249, 452; Pohl 309; *Ukrainskie* Vol 1, 270-88). A letter seized and decoded by the NKVD indicates that such OUN-B leaders as Shukhevych and Klymiv, and OUN-B regional organizations, specifically in the Volyn Region, were requested by Gestapo before the German-Soviet war to

compile lists of activists with the aim of their physical elimination (Sprava 12, 1941, 130–143, cited from Nakonechnyi 53). Evidence indicates certain cooperation of the OUN-B, for instance the marching groups led by Kuk and Klymyshyn, with Gestapo and Einsatzgruppen in the formation of the militia and apprehension and executions of Jews and Soviet activists in the summer of 1941 (Katchanovski, “OUN(b)”).

Similarly, OUN-B reports reveal the collaboration of the leaders of marching groups— notably Vasyl Kuk, Yaroslav Stetsko, Yaroslav Starukh, and Mykola Klymyshyn—with Abwehr and intelligence sections (I-C) attached to the Wehrmacht units in intelligence gathering and sabotage and diversions operations in Ukraine during the German invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer 1941 (*OUN* 242–43, 317, 426–27). Such collaboration gave these OUN-B groups the relative freedom of movement and some support from Abwehr and Wehrmacht, and enabled these marching groups and local OUN-B activists to establish regional and local militia and administrations, primarily in Galicia, Volhynia, the Zhytomyr Region, and to a certain extent in the Kyiv, Khmelnytsky, Vinnytsia, and Dnipropetrovsk in the summer and early fall of 1941, even after the German refusal to recognize the Ukrainian state proclaimed in Lviv on June 30, 1941 by a marching group headed by Stetsko. The militia organized by the OUN-B marching groups assisted in the mass executions of Jews, Soviet and Polish activists, and Soviet POWs by the Einsatzgruppen and other German formations in the summer and early fall of 1941 (Katchanovski, “OUN(b)”).

In many cases, it remains not entirely clear whether collaboration of OUN-B and UPA leaders with the German intelligence and security agencies was informal or whether it was formal, as was the case with at least some of the leaders of OUN-M marching groups, such as Bohdan Onufryk (Konyk) and Stepan Suliatynsky, who used their formal service in an Abwehr

Sondercommando to organize local police and administration in such cities and regions as Kyiv, Poltava, and Kharkiv in the fall of 1941 (Sprava 2185 FP;⁶ Sprava 69330 FP). In these and a large number of other locations in Central, Eastern, and Southern Ukraine, the police assisted in the mass murder of Jews, Ukrainian and Russian civilians, and POWs but the extent of the OUN influence in the police in many such locations, with the partial exception of Kharviv, requires further research (Berkhoff; Megargee and Dean; Radchenko).

Although the militia was reorganized by the German authorities into auxiliary police in the fall of 1941 and a significant number of OUN-B commanders and members were removed from the police and arrested, the OUN-B continued to maintain a substantial presence and informal control over many units of the auxiliary police, especially in Volhynia and Galicia (Himka, “The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists”). However, there was also documented activity of SiPo and SD, including Gestapo, directed against the OUN-B and the UPA, primarily, from the end of the summer of 1941 till the end of 1943 and involving mass arrests and to a lesser extent executions (*OUN; Ukrainskie*).

A platoon (*chota*) of the 31st SiPo and SD battalion, which was also called the Ukrainian Self-Defense Legion, deserted to the UPA in the middle of 1944, and a significant number of its commanders and members served in the UPA before joining this unit, which was organized by the SD and the OUN-M in Volhynia in the end of 1943. (Bolianovsky, *Ukrainski* 266, 301; Klymenko and Tkachov 193-201, 236–59). However, most of this battalion was incorporated into the SS Galicia Division. While a number of them were prosecuted in the Soviet Union and Poland, the majority of the legion’s servicemen were given refuge after the end of the war in such countries as the UK, the US, and Canada.⁷

A large proportion of commanders and members from the 31st security police and SD battalion served in the local militia and police in the Kremenets, Lutsk, and Volodymyr-Volynskyi areas when these formations assisted in mass murder of Jews, Ukrainians, and Poles there (Katchanovski, “OUN(b)”; Klymenko and Tkachov; Sprava 372, Vol 032, 182-96). For example, Mykola Nedzevedsky, who was the town and regional police commandant in Kremenets in 1941-43, served as an UPA commander after he was forced to join it along with many other members of his OUN-M unit in July 1943 and before most of them deserted and joined the SiPo Battalion 31 in December 1943 (Klymenko and Tkachov 99–100, 249). Most of the Volodymyr-Volynskyi police, which was under informal control of the OUN-M and the OUN-B and participated in Nazi-led mass executions of more than 20,000 Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians there, joined the UPA in 1943. A significant proportion of several dozen legion members from the Volodymyr-Volynskyi area worked in the police and Kripo/SD there, and many of them also were later in the UPA. For, example, Petro Glyn was one of several 31st battalion commanders and members, who served in the police or the Kripo/SD in the town of Volodymyr-Volynskyi and nearby locations and can be identified by name. Glyn also was an adjutant of an UPA company commander in the same area. The main UPA formation there, called “Sich,” was comprised mostly from former policemen from Volodymyr-Volynsky and neighboring towns and districts, and its commander (Porfyrii Antoniuk) was a police commander in Volodymyr-Volynskyi and Olevsk before he joined the UPA in the spring of 1943. (See, for instance, Katchanovski, “OUN(b)”; Klymenko and Tkachov 240; Tsaruk 377, 411, 867).

However, when remains of close to 1,500 people were found in 2011-13 and in 1997 near a former prison in Volodymyr-Volynskyi by Ukrainian and Polish archeologists, Ukrainian and Polish officials, media and experts initially publicly claimed that these were Polish victims

of the Katyn-style executions by the Soviet NKVD in 1939-41. The evidence, such as historical studies, archival documents, eyewitness testimonies, German bullets, and predominance of children and women in some of the mass graves, indicated that these people were executed by the Germans and the police in 1941-1944. The victims primarily included local Jews, but also many Poles, specifically former policemen, a large number of whom joined the AK, and Ukrainian civilians.⁸ (Katchanovski, "OUN(b)"; *Litopys UPA*, Vol. 11, 119; *Sprava 376*, Vol. 071, 6, Vol, 075, 62-67).

The 31st security police and SD battalion is implicated by different sources in the mass executions of Ukrainians, Jews, and Poles in the Volyn Region of Ukraine and in Poland. For example, analysis of testimonies by eyewitnesses and former battalion members, interviews with local residents, archival documents, and the fact of the urgent redeployment of this unit from the Kremenets area to the village of Pidhaitsi near Lutsk a day before a massacre there indicates its likely involvement in the mass murder of 21 Ukrainian residents of Pidhaitsi, half of whom were children, on December 3, 1943, under the pretext of a retaliation for the killing of a German soldier.⁹ The same sources and a number of historical studies show that this security police unit was responsible for the execution of about 100 prisoners from the Lutsk prison on the old grounds of the Pidhaitsi School in January 1944. Testimonies by local residents and former legion members and an exhumation of one of the mass graves indicate that the victims of the execution included both Jews and Ukrainians. There are also reports that this unit located and killed the same month more than 70 Jews, who were hiding in a forest near the Pidhaitsi village (Nakonechnyi 24). Testimonies by former legion members and historical studies implicate the legion, and, specifically, one of its companies under command of Michael Karkoc, in massacres of Polish residents of Korchunky and Edvardpole in the Volodymyr-Volynskyi area and

Chlaniow, Wladislawin, and Ameryka in the Lublin Region, and participation in the suppression of the Warsaw uprising in 1944. (See Klymenko and Tkachov; Littman 53-58; Majewski; Rising, Herschaft, and Scislowska; Sprava F-253).

Conclusion

The issue of the political rehabilitation and heroization of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) became one of the central political issues in Ukraine after the “Orange Revolution.” It provoked major political and historical controversies and debates in Ukraine and other countries. Former President Yushchenko, nationalist parties, and many Ukrainian historians attempted to recast the OUN-B and the UPA as parts of a popular national liberation movement that fought against Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union and to present the OUN-B and UPA leaders as national heroes. They denied, minimized or justified the involvement of the OUN-B and the UPA leaders and members in the mass murder of Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians.

The analyses of biographic publications, historical studies, and archival documents show that the majority of the OUN-B and UPA leaders and a very large proportion of members collaborated with Nazi Germany, mainly in the beginning of World War II. A significant percentage of the leaders and members of these organizations served in various police formations. They assisted the Nazi occupational authorities in implementing genocidal policies towards the Jews, Ukrainians, Russians, and Poles by helping to carry out mass executions and create conditions intended for the psychical annihilation of the entire Jewish population and significant numbers of Ukrainians, Russians, and Poles, specifically in Volhynia. The fact that many police commanders and large numbers of policemen in various locations and formations

followed orders from the OUN-B by deserting *en masse* from their service, in particular in Volhynia in the spring of 1943, and forming the basis of the UPA shows that these commanders and police members were *de facto* controlled by the OUN-B.

This study suggests a need for further research of certain issues that remain insufficiently explored, including the specific extent of the presence of former policemen in the UPA in Galicia and Bukovyna and the form of collaboration of many OUN-B and UPA leaders and members with the intelligence and security agencies of Nazi Germany. The involvement of OUN-B leaders and members, who organized and served in the regional and local administration, in the mass murders of the Jews, Gypsies, Soviet POWs, and the Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish civilian population during the German occupation also requires further research.

Table 1. Collaboration of the OUN-B and UPA leaders with Nazi Germany and other Axis countries during World War II (%)

| | Top rank | | | Middle rank | | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|----------------------------------|-------------|-----------|----------------------------------|
| | UPA* | SB | OUN-B, SB, UChKh, & UPA | UPA* | SB | OUN-B, SB, UChKh, & UPA |
| Police/militia and other similar formations | 49 | 36 | 34 | 42 | 15 | 35 |
| Nachtigall & Roland battalions and Bergbauern-Hilfe (Sushko Legion) | 16 | 7 | 12 | 25 | 0 | 20 |
| SS Galicia Division and other German & allied military formations | 1 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 7 |
| Local and regional administration | 16 | 7 | 12 | 5 | 0 | 4 |
| Intelligence, military, and security schools | 29 | 29 | 29 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Intelligence and security agencies | 28 | 21 | 28 | 4 | 0 | 4 |
| <i>Total, %</i> | <i>74</i> | <i>64</i> | <i>63</i> | <i>58</i> | <i>23</i> | <i>49</i> |
| N | 69 | 14 | 119 | 165 | 13 | 210 |

Notes: Calculated from Sodol with use of other sources.

* Excludes the SB and the Ukrainian Red Cross (UChKh), which were controlled by the OUN-B but also acted, respectively, as the security service and the medical service of the UPA.

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¹ “European Parliament resolution of 25 February 2010 on the situation in Ukraine,” Feb. 25 2010. European Parliament. Web. March 4 2010. <<http://www.europarl.europa.eu>>; “Wiesenthal Center Blasts Ukrainian Honor for Nazi Collaborator.” Wiesenthal Center. Web. Feb. 27, 2010. <<http://www.wiesenthal.com>>.

² Katchanovski, Ivan, “Role of Far-Right Nationalists in Ukraine Protests,” Moscow Times, February 12, 2014, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/role-of-far-right-nationalists-in-kiev-protests/494349.html>.

³ “Yushchenko ob antisemitakh v rukovodstve Ukrainy: “Takikh liudei net” (Interviu).” Web. Nov. 9, 2010. http://www.newsru.co.il/israel/15nov2007/yushenko_int_106.html>.

⁴ This number does not include members of the SB, the OUN-B underground, and local self-defense units.

⁵ Excludes the SB and the UChKh.

⁶ Cited from <<http://fundacijapnp.pl>>.

⁷ Preliminary investigations concerning the involvement of Michael Karkoc, who was one of commanders of this security police and SD unit, in massacres committed by the legion were launched in Germany and Poland after the Associated Press story revealed in 2013 that he was living in the US (Rising, David, Randy Herschaft, and Monika Scislowska, “AP Impact: Commander of Nazi-led unit lives in US,” June 14, 2013, <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/ap-impact-commander-ss-led-unit-living-us>.) There is no evidence of prosecutions of any of former legion commanders and members, a number of whom published memoirs, became leaders of the Volhynia society and prominent Orthodox priests in the UK, the US, and Canada (See Klymenko and Tkachov, 236-259).

⁸ Similarly, 23 people, mostly Jews from Vienna, whose mass grave was exhumed in 2013 near Drohobych in the Lviv Region in Western Ukraine, were misrepresented by local scholars, politicians and the media as victims of NKVD prison executions in June 1941. This politically-motivated falsification was done in spite of publications by local historians and a published diary of Felix Landau about an execution by his Einsatzkommando of 23 civilians at that location on July 12, 1941.

⁹ Sprava F-253; Sprava 16, 4; Sprava 9, 50; interview with Mykola Traskovsky, Pidhaitsi, July 4, 2011; Rising, Herschaft, and Scislowska.