
Rear Area Operations



U.S. Marine Corps

Coordinating Draft of 9 July 1999

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Headquarters United States Marine Corps
Washington, DC 20308-1775

xx Month 1999

FOREWORD

1. PURPOSE

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-41.1, *Rear Area Operations*, describes how the Marine Corps plans and executes rear area operations. The principles and planning considerations for rear area operations are applicable to the Marine Corps component and all Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) and their subordinate commands.

2. SCOPE

This publication describes higher order tactics, techniques, and procedures for rear area operations. It addresses the functions that occur within the rear area—integrated within the warfighting functions—to support the conduct of the single battle. This publication discusses the command and control of rear area operations (from the joint level to individual bases), planning considerations, and execution of the rear area operations functions.

3. SUPERSESSION

This manual replaces Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 2-6, *MAGTF Rear Area Security*.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CHANGES

Recommendations and changes for improving this publication are invited from commands as well as directly from individuals. Forward suggestions using the user suggestion format via either of the following means:

COMMANDING GENERAL
DOCTRINE DIVISION (C421)
MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134-5021

E-mail:

Banyan — FORCE[smb@doctrine div@mccdc]
Internet — smb@quantico.usmc.mil

Recommendations should include the following information:

- Location of change: publication number and title; current page number; paragraph number (if applicable); line number; figure number (if applicable).
- Nature of change: add, delete; and proposed new text (preferably double-spaced and typewritten).
- Justification and/or source of change.

5. OBTAINING ADDITIONAL COPIES

Additional printed copies of MCWP 3-41.1 may be obtained from Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA 31704-5001, by following the instructions in MCBul 5600, *Marine Corps*

Doctrinal Publications Status. Electronic copies may be obtained from the Doctrine Division, MCCDC, worldwide web homepage which is found at the following universal reference locator (letters in lower case): **<http://138.156.107.3/docdiv>**.

6. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

- The proponent for MCWP 3-41.1 is the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Staff Training Program (MSTP), Marine Corps Combat Development Command.
- Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both men and women are indicated.

7. CERTIFICATION

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE
MARINE CORPS

J. E. RHODES
Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding General
Marine Corps Combat Development Command

DISTRIBUTION: 143 000xx 00

Table of Contents

		Page
Chapter 1.	Fundamentals	
1001.	Protect the Force	1-3
1002.	Support the Force	1-4
1003.	The Rear Area	1-5
1004.	Joint Doctrine	1-10
1005.	Army Perspective	1-10
1006.	Marine Corps Perspective	1-11
	Rear Area Operations Case Study: Guadalcanal 1942	1-13
Chapter 2.	Command and Control	
2001.	Command and Control in the Joint Rear Area	2-2
2002.	Organization of Marine Corps Forces	2-7
2003.	Command and Control in Marine Corps Rear Areas	2-11
2004.	Base Defense	2-20
Chapter 3.	Planning	
3001.	Marine Corps Planning Process	3-2
3002.	Warfighting Functions	3-5
3003.	The Operational Planning Team	3-11
3004.	Liaisons	3-13

Chapter 4. Execution

4001.	Security	4-1
4002.	Communications	4-8
4003.	Intelligence	4-8
4004.	Sustainment	4-10
4005.	Area Management	4-11
4006.	Movements	4-12
4007.	Infrastructure Development	4-15
4008.	Host Nation Support	4-16

Appendices

A	Rear Area Operations Appendix Format	A-1
B	Glossary	B-1
C	References	C-1

Figures

1-1	Contiguous battlespace	1-8
1-2	Noncontiguous battlespace	1-9
2-1	Joint rear area command relationships	2-6
2-2	Example of base defense command relationships	2-21
3-1	Marine Corps planning process	3-3
3-2	Force protection	3-6
3-3	Logistics	3-7
3-4	Command and control	3-8
3-5	Maneuver	3-9
3-6	Fires	3-10
3-7	Intelligence	3-11

Tables

2-1	Rear area coordinator	2-16
2-2	Rear area commander	2-17
2-3	Rear area command and control facilities	2-19
4-1	Threat levels and response forces	4-7

Chapter 1

Fundamentals

“That the rear of an enemy’s army is the point to hit at should be obvious.”

—Major General J.F.C. Fuller

The amphibious operation at Inchon, and subsequent disruption of the North Korean rear area by allied forces during the Korean Conflict, is a classic illustration of the importance of the rear area. General Douglas MacArthur conceived the Inchon landing as, “...the opportunity for a decisive blow ... The seizure of the heart of the enemy distributing system in the Seoul area will completely dislocate the logistical supply of his forces now operating in South Korea and therefore will ultimately result in their disintegration.” By attacking in the rear area, the allies severed the principal lines of communications used by the enemy for the movement of men and materiel. The North Koreans’ ability to support and protect their forces was so seriously degraded that they could no longer conduct offensive operations. The North Koreans were soon forced to retreat in disorder far north of the 38th parallel.

Rear area operations were also critical to the success of coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm. The extensive air operations and ground force maneuver across wide

expanses of desert were only possible because the rear area was secure. This allowed unimpeded sustainment, transportation, communications, engineering, and security operations to be conducted in the rear area. The enemy's inability to disrupt these rear area activities allowed uninterrupted support for close and deep operations and helped the coalition to create a rapid tempo of operations.

Rear area operations **protect** assets in the rear area used to **support** the force. These rear area operations are more than rear area *security*. While rear area operations are conducted to provide security for personnel, materiel, and facilities in the rear area, they have the larger purpose of providing uninterrupted support to the force as a whole. Rear area operations enhance freedom of action of the forces involved in the close and deep fight and extend the operational reach of the force as a whole.

Rear area operations are **evolutionary** in character. As the operation progresses, the geographic location, command and control structure, and organization of the rear area can be expected to change. The broad functions of rear area operations, as delineated within both joint and Marine Corps doctrine, include—

- Security.
- Communications.
- Intelligence.
- Sustainment.
- Area Management.

- Movements.
- Infrastructure development.
- Host nation support.

1001. Protect the Force

Force protection is essential for all military operations from war to military operations other than war. Force protection conserves resources—lives, equipment, and materiel—so they can be used to accomplish the mission. Conserving resources is the basic concept behind force protection.

Force protection includes every action or measure that conserves combat power so it can be applied at the decisive time and place. These actions include more than self-protection or base protection measures. They also include actions to reduce or eliminate the ability of the enemy or the environment to adversely affect the force's capability to conduct successful operations. Force protection is conducted at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

Force protection attempts to safeguard our centers of gravity by protecting or reducing friendly critical vulnerabilities. This may include the protection of the sea, air, and land lines of communications or the protection of host nation infrastructure to preserve it for friendly use. Aggressive force protection planning and execution is critical to the success of rear area operations. Protecting the forces, facilities, and assets in the rear area preserves the warfighting capability of the total force and increases its operational reach.

1002. Support the Force

Force protection measures protect those critical forces, equipment, supplies, and components of the infrastructure needed to support the force. Support aids or sustains a force. Support sustains tempo and extends operational reach.

Sustainment of the force is primarily, although not exclusively, associated with logistics support. Operational and tactical level logistics occur within the rear area. Operational level logistics operations occur in the communications zone and in the joint rear area. These activities are a bridge between the strategic level logistics functions and the tactical level logistics functions. They sustain the force within the theater or during major operations. The conduit for this support for Marine Corps forces is the Marine Corps component. The combatant command-level Marine Corps component commander may establish a rear area command and control organization to facilitate that transition from the operational to the tactical level of support. The operational level support functions occurring in the rear area include—

- Force closure.
- Arrival/assembly.
- Theater distribution.
- Sustainment.
- Intratheater lift.
- Reconstitution/redeployment.
- Services.

Within the MAGTF area of operations, support activities in the rear area occur primarily at the tactical level. For sustainment operations the functions at the tactical level of logistics (also referred to as the six functions of combat service support) are—

- Supply.
- Maintenance.
- General Engineering.
- Health Services.
- Transportation.
- Services.

Other types of support, not strictly logistic in nature, which may occur in the joint, component, or MAGTF rear areas include—

- Manning.
- Civil-military support.
- Political-military support.
- Civil affairs.
- Evacuation.
- Religious.
- Training.

1003. The Rear Area

Joint Pub 1-02, *DOD Dictionary for Military and Associated Terms*, defines the rear area as follows:

For any particular command, the area extending forward from its rear boundary to the rear of the area assigned to the next lower level of command. This area is provided primarily for the performance of support functions.

Joint Pub 1-02 goes on to define the *joint* rear area as—

A specific land area within a joint force commander's operational area designated to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force.

The joint force commander, either a combatant commander, subordinate unified commander, or a joint task force commander, normally designates a joint rear area. This area is designated to facilitate the conduct of support operations and their protection, but only includes the land mass. *Normally airspace and sea areas are not included in the joint rear area as they are considered combat zones.* Specific subordinate commanders are given responsibility for conducting combat operations in these areas. When the sea area and land area meet, the high water mark serves as the boundary.

When conducting operations through Service components, the joint force commander may assign the Marine Corps component commander an area of operations for which he has responsibility. This area of operations should be large enough for him to accomplish his assigned mission and protect his forces. Marine Corps commanders may similarly assign an

area of operations, and associated responsibility, to their subordinate commanders.

During small scale contingencies, or when operating within a joint task force, the MAGTF area of operations may be the same as the component area of operations. (When part of a joint task force, the Marine Corps component commander may also be the MAGTF commander. See Chapter 2 for more information on command relationships.) In a major theater of war, the MAGTF area of operations may only be a portion of the component area of operations.

The joint rear area is normally behind the combat zone and within the communications zone. It does not have to be contiguous to the combat zone. (Webster's Dictionary defines contiguous as, "sharing a boundary or edge; adjacent.") As with any command's rear area, the joint rear area will vary in size depending on the logistic requirements, threat, and scope of combat operations.

Contiguous battlespace is normally organized in a linear manner with the deep, close and rear areas adjacent to each other and oriented toward the enemy. Figure 1-1 shows a basic organization for contiguous battlespace. Noncontiguous battlespace is organized in a nonlinear manner. The rear area is therefore not always easily delineated as it can be a part of either contiguous or noncontiguous battlespace.




Figure 1-1. Contiguous battlespace.

In a noncontiguous battlespace the rear area could be located in several different locations and at great distances from the majority of Marine units. Figure 1-2 illustrates several ways a noncontiguous battlespace may be organized. Often, the component and MAGTF have organizations outside the boundaries of their areas of operation, yet retain responsibilities for the protection or support of the units in those areas. In these cases, the component commander and the MAGTF commander determine a division of responsibility for the support and protection of those units. In all cases, each commander thinks of his area of operations as an undivided whole in which he orchestrates a single battle.




Figure 1-2. Noncontiguous battlespace.

The size and shape of a rear area may be particularly fluid. Places within the area of operations may be “de facto” rear areas; i.e., metropolitan zones or regions isolated by geographic boundaries that become relatively segregated from the main areas of conflict. The commander may designate such areas as a part of the rear area. Austere conditions should be anticipated. Support facilities, population receptiveness, and overall host nation support may be unpredictable and unreliable. The unit will normally have to rely on its own resources for support until transportation infrastructure is established.

1004. Joint Doctrine

The Marine Corps will normally operate as part of a joint force. It is therefore essential that Marine planners have a solid grasp of joint doctrine concerning the rear area. Joint doctrine discusses rear area operations from the perspective of a joint force commander, either a combatant commander or a joint task force commander. The joint force commander designates a joint rear area to facilitate protection and support of the joint force. He is responsible for all operations conducted in the rear area. During peacetime, measures and procedures are established to preserve the combat power of forces assigned. During wartime, established procedures and measures may be modified to ensure forces are able to carry out their assigned missions.

The joint force commander may designate a member of his staff or a subordinate commander as the joint rear area coordinator. Normally a Service component commander is tasked with being the joint rear area coordinator. The joint rear area coordinator coordinates all aspects of joint rear area operations for the joint force commander.

1005. Army Perspective

Because the Marine Corps frequently operates with the Army, it is important to understand Army rear area operations doctrine. The Army has written extensively on the conduct of rear area operations. They have discussions on the integrated

functions of rear area operations throughout their doctrine. The Army Service component uses a decentralized command and control network of area commanders to exercise responsibility for rear area operations.

The Army has an especially well developed rear area doctrine and structure at the corps level. The corps commander establishes two command posts. The main command post synchronizes rear area operations with those of the deep and close. The rear command post staff creates a detailed plan for conducting rear area operations and integrating rear area functions into a concept of operations that supports the commander's concept and intent. The corps' rear command post is organized to perform four functions—movement, terrain management, sustainment, and security. Communications and intelligence are addressed within the overall operation, while host nation support and infrastructure development are normally conducted at the joint or component levels.

1006. Marine Corps Perspective

The Marine Corps has a view of rear area operations that, while similar to the Army viewpoint, is more closely based in joint doctrine. Marine and Army doctrine is similar in that both Services agree that the rear area functions are interrelated and impact operations throughout the battlespace. The Marine Corps believes that each rear area function should be addressed relative to *mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available* (METT-T)

considerations. The Marine Corps differs with the Army in that it addresses all of the eight functions at each echelon of command.

A less conceptual and more tangible difference between the two Services is the standardized organization and force structure that the Army dedicates to rear area operations. The Army's role within the national defense structure makes a significant commitment of resources to the rear area as part of their standard organization virtually a necessity. Army doctrine focuses heavily on the tactics, techniques and procedures that these standing organizations can use.

These tactics, techniques and procedures may be useful for Marines in certain situations. Given the expeditionary character of the Marine Corps and its employment of task organized forces tailored to accomplish a wide variety of missions, our doctrine focuses on concepts which will assist commanders and their staffs in planning, organizing and employing forces for rear area operations in accordance with METT-T. While this methodology offers a great deal of flexibility in organization and execution, it also places a greater demand on decisionmakers. This publication provides Marine leaders the conceptual knowledge, suited to the unique nature of our Corps, required for the planning and execution of rear area operations.

Rear Area Operations Case Study: Guadalcanal 1942

In August 1942 Marines landed on Guadalcanal as the first step in a three-part campaign plan to stop the Japanese advance in the Pacific and begin offensive operations through the Solomon Islands towards the major enemy base at Rabaul. The 1st Marine Division, under the command of Major General A. A. Vandegrift, immediately seized the island's partially completed airfield but did not have the combat power to secure the balance of an island 25 miles wide and 90 miles long.

General Vandegrift considered a counter-landing to be the major threat to his force and therefore established the bulk of his defenses along the coast. His meager supplies and equipment had been hastily stockpiled on the beach, so moving those items to an inland rear area, away from where he anticipated his close fight to take place, was an immediate priority. (Security/sustainment.) Until Marine aircraft could operate from the captured airstrip General Vandegrift's deep fight was limited to the range of his artillery, so he set the completion of the airfield as his highest priority. (Infrastructure development.)

In the days and weeks that followed the principal enemy counteractions were daylight air attack and nighttime naval surface fires. The rear area was therefore reorganized, with command and control facilities relocated to locations shielded from naval gunfire and supply dumps dispersed to a greater

degree to enhance survivability. (Communications.) The establishment of a small naval operating base unit enhanced ship-to-shore re-supply. (Sustainment.) Ground transportation to support these actions was limited, however, so the Marines hired local natives to provide the requisite manual labor. (Host nation support.) Completion of the airfield meant that the Marines could add greater depth to the battlespace in order to interdict enemy air and sea power before it got to the island. Navy and Army Air Force squadrons eventually reinforced Marine air and, with the help of recently arrived Seabees, a second airfield was constructed to further disperse and protect the aircraft. (Infrastructure development.)

As the battle progressed information gathered from U.S. and native sources indicated that the enemy would attempt to capture the airfield using the island's interior approaches. (Intelligence, host nation support.) General Vandegrift repositioned his ground defenses accordingly. This repositioning included not only the infantry units manning his perimeter but also the location of his reserve and his artillery within the constricted rear area in order to better support the close fight as it developed. (Area management.) Additional ground combat units, both Marine and Army, were committed to Guadalcanal, allowing General Vandegrift to expand his perimeter in order to protect the airfields from direct enemy fire. (Security.)

While nominally the Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division, as the American commander on Guadalcanal General Vandegrift had, by November 1942, command of over 40,000 men constituting the equivalent of two divisions,

a joint tactical air force and an assortment of support troops from all Services. The command, control and support requirements for a force of this size clearly exceeded the capability of a division headquarters. In December 1942 the Guadalcanal command was therefore expanded to an Army corps. Successful air and naval operations curtailed the flow of enemy reinforcements to the island, while the arrival of additional fresh American divisions changed the character of ground operations. The newly established XIV Corps began an offensive to finally clear the enemy from the island. The increase in troop strength also brought a commensurate requirement for logistics support. The Army therefore assumed responsibility for re-supply of all troops on the island. (Sustainment.) Given the primitive road network on the island, road improvement, traffic control and the forward positioning of supplies were essential for a successful offensive. (Infrastructure development, movements, sustainment.)

Once Guadalcanal was secured the entire island became, in effect, a rear area which supported the advance up the Solomons chain. The command structure changed again when it was placed under the administrative control of an island commander with a variety of tenant commands present. Aircraft from all Services conducted offensive air operations from its airfields while ground combat units utilized its terrain for realistic training areas and its expanded facilities to mount out for the follow-on phases of the campaign. Guadalcanal remained in operation as a support and training base right up until the end of the war, whereupon personnel stationed there completed their final tasks, the closing and turnover of

facilities and material to the host nation, selective explosive ordnance disposal and the retrograde of personnel and equipment.

While the above case study of the Guadalcanal campaign is by no means a comprehensive account, it serves to illustrate that the eight functions of rear area operations are not a novel concept. It also demonstrates the interrelationship between deep, close and rear area operations. It is, finally, a classic example of the evolutionary nature of rear area operations.

Chapter 2

Command and Control

“Command and control is the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken ... The commander commands by deciding what needs to be done and by directing or influencing the conduct of others. Control takes the form of feedback—the continuous flow of information about the unfolding situation returning to the commander—which allows the commander to adjust and modify command action as needed.”

—MCDP 6, *Command and Control*

Successful rear area operations require a reliable command and control structure. Central to the command and control of these operations is the organizational structure of the area within which the forces are operating. This organizational structure includes joint, combined (if present), and Service structure. Other command and control structures include communications, intelligence, planning, and deployment systems. The rear area communications network should be linked to higher, adjacent and subordinate commands (to include joint or combined), supporting organization(s), and the principal staff of the main command post.

2001. Command and Control in the Joint Rear Area

The joint force commander is ultimately responsible for the successful conduct of rear area operations within the joint operating area. He normally establishes a joint rear area and designates a joint rear area coordinator to aid the command and control of operations.

The joint force commander designates the joint rear area coordinator from his staff or from one of his subordinate commanders. Service component commanders may be assigned as the joint rear area coordinator.

a. Joint Force Commander

The geographic combatant commander is ultimately responsible for rear area operations within his area of responsibility. Likewise a subordinate unified or joint task force commander is responsible for rear area operations in their area of operations or joint operating area. The general term joint force commander will be used to represent all three of these commanders. The joint force commander's responsibilities also include:

- Establishing a joint rear area.
- Planning and executing rear area operations.
- Establishing command relationships.
- Assigning responsibilities to subordinate commanders for the conduct of rear area operations.

- Establishing a command and control network.
- Establishing measures and procedures for the planning and execution of force protection.
- Establishing the classification of bases (single Service or joint).
- Assigning local defense responsibilities for bases.
- Establishing host nation support agreements.

b. Joint Rear Area Coordinator

The joint force commander normally designates a joint rear area coordinator to facilitate the command and control of operations in the joint rear area. The joint rear area coordinator can be a member of the joint force commander's staff or one of the assigned subordinate commanders. The joint force commander considers the mission, force capability, threat, and the joint rear area in determining who to designate as the joint rear area coordinator. The joint rear area coordinator is responsible for—

- Coordinating the overall security of the joint rear area.
- Ensuring continuous support to all forces.
- Coordinating with the appropriate commanders in the rear area.
- Establishing secure and survivable communications.
- Ensuring a reliable intelligence network is established.
- Ensuring all commands practice effective area management and movement control within their area of operations in support of the theater policies and requirements.

- Coordinating host nation support for commands operating within the joint rear area.
- Accomplishing other tasks assigned by the joint force commander.

The joint rear area coordinator coordinates all rear area operations with forces located in or transiting through the joint rear area. In particular, he coordinates security operations, to include the use of the theater-level security forces. He establishes a communications and intelligence network to support all commanders within the joint rear area. He also establishes or implements joint rear area policies and procedures for the joint force commander.

The joint force commander can assign tasks to a subordinate commander which would normally be assigned to the joint rear area coordinator. For example, when a major threat exists, he can task one of the component commanders to counter the threat to maintain the integrity of the rear area. In this case, the authority and responsibility normally resident with the joint rear area coordinator would be exercised by the component commander for the duration of the emergency.

The joint rear area coordinator has the specific responsibility to coordinate with subordinate commanders to—

- Create a security environment that supports the joint force commander's concept of operations.
- Develop an integrated and coordinated security plan.

- Position and use the tactical combat force, if established, appropriately.
- Establish a responsive and integrated intelligence and counterintelligence network.
- Develop an effective communications network.
- Ensure area management responsibilities are exercised with due consideration for security.
- Ensure liaison has been established between host nation and U.S. forces.
- Protect key lines of communication.
- Protect support activities.
- Disseminate and enforce rules of engagement.

To accomplish his responsibilities, the joint rear area coordinator normally forms a joint rear tactical operations center. It assists the joint rear area coordinator in the command and control of rear area operations, and performs planning, coordinating, monitoring, and advising tasks. The joint rear area tactical operations center coordinates with other joint rear area coordinator staff elements, higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters staffs, and with the host nation and coalition headquarters staffs.

The rear area tactical operations center is principally comprised of personnel from the joint rear area coordinator's staff and representatives from the components operating in the joint rear area. They are responsible for planning and executing security missions and coordination with the component commands operating in the joint rear area.

c. Area Command

The joint force commander may elect to divide the joint rear area by forming component commands with area responsibilities. These commands, normally Army or Marine Corps commands, operate in a single geographic area under a single commander. These area commanders coordinate their rear area activities with the joint rear area coordinator. Figure 2-1 illustrates a typical joint rear area command relationship in a theater of operations.




Figure 2-1. Joint rear area command relationships.

The Marine Corps component command may locate support forces such as the Marine Corps logistics command (if established), as well as some MAGTF forces (such as portions of the aviation combat element) in the joint rear area.

2002. Organization of Marine Corps Forces

All joint forces with Marine Corps forces assigned or attached include a Marine Corps component. Regardless of how the joint force commander conducts operations, the Marine Corps component provides administrative and logistical support to the Marine Corps forces. The joint force commander assigns missions to the Marine Corps component commander. The Marine Corps component commander assigns missions to the MAGTF, the Marine Corps logistics command (if established), the rear area command (if established), and the assigned or attached forces of other services and nations.

The Marine Corps component-MAGTF command relationship and staff organization that the Marine Corps component commander selects depends on the mission, size, scope, and duration of the operation and the size of the assigned force. Three possible command relationships and staff organizations are—

- **One Commander and One Staff.** The commander is both the Marine Corps component and MAGTF commander. The single staff executes both Marine Corps component and MAGTF functions. This arrangement requires the fewest personnel but places the heaviest work load on the commander and the staff.

A variation of the one commander and one staff organization is *one commander and one staff with a component augmentation cell*. For example, if a

combatant commander establishes a joint task force to deal with a small scale contingency, the combatant command-level Marine Corps component commander might provide a deployable cell to augment the MAGTF staff. While requiring additional personnel, the size of this staff is still relatively small.

Both variations of one commander and one staff may be most appropriate for small-scale contingencies. The one commander, one staff arrangement was used during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia.

- **One Commander and Two Staffs.** The commander is both the Marine Corps component and MAGTF commander, but there are two separate staffs. One staff executes the functions of the Marine Corps component while the other executes the functions of the MAGTF. This allows each staff to maintain a single, focused orientation. The number of personnel will increase with two staffs. This arrangement may be appropriate when the joint force commander is geographically separated from combat forces. This arrangement was used for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
- **Two Commanders and Two Staffs.** Two commanders with separate staffs require the most personnel, equipment, and facilities. There are two separate commanders, each with a dedicated staff. This arrangement may be used for major theater of war operations.

a. Marine Corps Component Commander

The Marine Corps component commander sets the conditions for conducting MAGTF operations. He achieves this by providing and sustaining the Marine Corps forces which execute tasks assigned to him by the joint force commander. He also plans and coordinates tasks within the rear area assigned by the joint force commander. In all cases, he has specific responsibilities for conducting rear area operations in support of all Marine Corps forces in the theater. He is also responsible for—

- Advising the joint force commander on the proper employment of Marine Corps forces.
- Selecting and nominating specific Marine Corps units or forces for assignment to other forces of the joint force commander.
- Informing the joint force commander on changes in logistic support issues, which could effect the joint force commander's ability to accomplish the mission.
- Assigning executive agent responsibilities to Marine Corps forces for rear area tasks.

The joint force commander may assign the Marine Corps component commander specific rear area responsibilities to be conducted by Marine Corps forces in the theater (e.g., area damage control, convoy security, movement control). The joint force commander may also require the Marine Corps component commander to provide a tactical combat force to counter threats to the joint rear area. Additionally, he may designate the Marine Corps component commander as the

joint rear area coordinator (normally in a small scale contingency).

The Marine Corps component commander coordinates Service-related rear area operations issues. He balances the need to support the force with the need to protect it. He evaluates his requirements versus capabilities, identifies shortfalls, and compares the associated risks with his ability to accomplish the mission. This is especially important where the component commander does not have enough assets to accomplish the tasks. He must then look to the assigned MAGTF, unassigned Marine Corps forces, the Service forces, or to the host nation for assistance. The Marine Corps component commander, whenever possible, uses forces available from sources other than the MAGTF to accomplish his rear area tasks.

b. MAGTF Commander

The MAGTF commander is responsible for operations throughout his entire battlespace. He provides command and control to fight a single battle—deep, close and rear.

Integration and coordination of rear area operations are a key part of MAGTF operations. Integration and coordination begin during planning. Rear area representatives must be present during all MAGTF planning. Their participation assists the commander in organizing his assigned capabilities to accomplish his mission. For example, the integration of rear area fire support requirements into the MAGTF's fire plan is a critical requirement. Air support requests for the rear area are submitted for incorporation in the MAGTF air tasking order.

Main supply routes, transportation assets, and logistics support which all flow from the rear area must be organized to support the MAGTF commander's concept of operations.

c. Major Subordinate Commanders

Major subordinate commanders of the MAGTF or Marine Corps component execute most of the rear area operations functions. For example, the force service support group may execute the movement control plan for the Marine expeditionary force.

A major subordinate commander could also be appointed the rear area coordinator or rear area commander. For example, the MAGTF commander could designate the combat service support element commander as his rear area coordinator.

2003. Command and Control in Marine Corps Rear Areas

Successful rear area operations require an effective command and control organization and reliable command and control systems, including communications, intelligence, and planning. Three options for command and control of rear area operations are for the commander to—

- Retain command and control himself.
- Designate a rear area coordinator.
- Designate a rear area commander.

The commander determines how he will command and control rear area operations based on his analysis of METT-T factors. Additionally, he must consider how higher commanders will command and control rear area operations (e.g., battlespace, organization, force laydown) to ensure that his arrangements support their intent and concept of operations.

Other general factors the commander considers include location, manning, equipment requirements, and procedures. Location will greatly influence the other factors. Rear area operations may be conducted from an existing facility—by an existing organization, by a cell within an existing organization, or by a separate organization collocated with a host organization—or from a single-purpose facility established specifically for rear area operations.

The rear area coordinator or rear area commander can be the commander's deputy, a member of the commander's staff, a subordinate commander, or an individual assigned to the command specifically for that purpose. The difference between a commander and a coordinator is the degree of authority—

- **Coordinating authority** allows the designated individual to coordinate specific functions or activities; in this case rear area functions. A coordinator has the authority to require consultation between agencies, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. If the agencies cannot reach an agreement, the matter is referred to the common commander. Coordinating authority is a consultation

relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.

- **Command** includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.

The rear area, and the operations conducted within it, will typically expand and contract based on the character and progression of the assigned mission and the operating environment. The organization and structure of forces and resources employed within the rear area, along with the corresponding command and control structure, may likewise undergo significant change as the situation evolves. During the initial stages of an operation the Marine commander may retain command and control of rear area operations. As ports and air bases are uncovered or established and more Marine Corps forces flow into theater, the Marine commander may designate a rear area coordinator to handle rear area operations. Finally, as the theater develops further—with numerous forward deployed forces, extensive transportation infrastructure (ports, highway networks, airfields, and railroads), or a rear area threat which requires a tactical combat force—the Marine commander may designate a rear area commander.

However the commander elects to command and control rear area operations, the rear area functions of security,

communications, intelligence, sustainment, area management, movement, infrastructure development and host-nation support must be conducted.

a. Command and Control Retained by the Commander

The commander may retain command and control of rear area operations himself. He might choose to do this when—

- The scope, duration, or complexity of the operation is limited.
- The battlespace is restricted.
- The nature of the mission is fundamentally linked to the rear area, such as humanitarian assistance or disaster relief.
- The enemy threat to rear area operations is low.
- Retention is a logical early phase of an evolutionary process (e.g., initiation of operations).

Operation Restore Hope in Somalia is an example of the commander retaining control of rear area operations. The joint task force commander's mission was

... to secure major air and sea ports, key installations, and food distribution points to provide open and free passage of relief supplies; to provide security for convoys and relief organizations; and assist United Nations and nongovernmental organizations in providing humanitarian relief under United Nations auspices.

As they initially constituted the preponderance of the joint force, these tasks were principally executed by Marines. Given the inherent link between rear area operation and the overall mission, Major General Charles E. Wilhelm—Commander, Marine Corps Forces Somalia and Commanding General, I MEF (Forward)—retained control of all eight rear area functions.

b. Rear Area Coordinator

The commander may elect to delegate control of some or all rear area operations to a rear area coordinator. He might choose to do this when—

- The scope, duration, or complexity of the operation increases.
- The assigned battlespace increases in size.
- The enemy threat level in the rear area increases, thereby requiring a greater degree of coordination.
- He wants one person to focus on rear area operations so that he can concentrate on the close and deep fight.
- The delegation of control over the rear area is the next logical phase of an evolutionary process (e.g., build-up of forces in theater).

Operation Desert Shield is an example of the commander designating a rear area coordinator. Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer—Commander, Marine Corps Forces Central Command and Commanding General, I MEF—designated one of his subordinate commanders, Brigadier General James A.

Brabham—Commanding General, 1st Force Service Support Group— as his rear area coordinator.

Table 2-1 shows the appropriate titles for a rear area coordinator at the various Marine Corps command echelons.

Echelon	Title
Marine Corps component	Marine rear area coordinator
MAGTF/major subordinate command	Rear area coordinator

Table 2-1. Rear area coordinator.

c. Rear Area Commander

The commander may elect to delegate control of some or all rear area operations to a rear area commander. He might choose to do this when—

- The scope, duration, or complexity of the operation reaches a level that rear area operations demand a commander’s full time and attention and also exceeds the scope of a coordinator’s authority.
- The assigned battlespace is of such an extended size that it must be subdivided to effectively command and control.
- The enemy threat level (Level III) in the rear area is significant enough that it requires a combined arms task force (tactical combat force) to counter. (See 4001f and table 4-1.)

- He wants to assign authority for any or all of the rear area functions under a subordinate commander, with the customary authority and accountability inherent to command.
- The designation of a rear area command is the next, and ultimate, phase of an evolutionary process (e.g., expansion of the battlespace).

Operation Desert Storm provides an example of the commander designating a rear area commander. Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer—Commander, Marine Corps Forces Central Command and Commanding General, I MEF—designated his deputy commander, Major General John I. Hopkins, as his rear area commander.

Table 2-2 shows the appropriate titles for a rear area commander at the various Marine Corps command echelons.

Echelon	Title
Marine Corps component	Marine rear area commander
MAGTF/major subordinate command	Rear area commander

Table 2-2. Rear area commander.

d. Command and Control Facilities

The rear area coordinator or rear area commander, if designated, will normally establish a facility from which he will command, control, coordinate and execute rear area

operations. This facility will normally contain an operations cell and a logistics cell to coordinate the activities of organizations such as—

- Security forces (military police, tactical combat force, etc.)
- Fire support agencies.
- Support units (supply, engineer, medical, etc.)
- Movement control agencies.
- Other command and control facilities.
- Bases and base clusters.
- Other organizations as necessary (counterintelligence team, civil affairs group).

A rear area command and control facility may be located within or adjacent to an existing facility or it may be a single-purpose facility. When located within or adjacent to an existing facility, a rear area command and control facility may be able to use some of the existing facility's personnel and equipment, thus reducing the need for additional resources. Given the scope of rear area operations within a major theater of war, it may be necessary to establish a separate rear area command and control facility.

Table 2-3 shows the appropriate titles for rear area command and control organizations at the various Marine Corps command echelons. While the establishment of the various rear area command and control organizations is left to the commander, the naming of those organizations should conform to the table to promote common understanding.

Echelon	Title	Facility
Marine Corps component	• Marine rear area coordinator (MRAC)	• Marine rear area operations center (MRAOC)
	• Marine rear area commander (MRACOM)	• Marine rear area command post (MRACP)
MAGTF/major subordinate command	• Rear area coordinator (RAC)	• Rear area operations center (RAOC)
	• Rear area commander (RACOM)	• Rear area command post (RACP)

Table 2-3. Rear area command and control organizations.

The rear area coordinator or rear area commander executes assigned tasks to ensure that rear area operations support the conduct of the tactical operations in the close and deep battle. The rear area command and control facility integrates and coordinates its activities with the main and forward command posts to ensure that the Marine Corps component or MAGTF commander has a better understanding of the battlespace and can influence and orchestrate the single battle.


The rear area command and control facility must have reliable communications and connectivity with the higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters involved in rear area operations. Connectivity to the joint rear area intelligence network, movement control infrastructure, and other support structures is vital to the successful conduct of rear area operations.

2004. Base Defense

Base defense is an important part of rear area operations. Security is a basic responsibility of every commander. The inherent right of self-defense against hostile acts or hostile intent applies in all operations. Base defense forces should not be confused with tactical combat forces. Base defense forces provide ongoing security for specific locations (a base), while tactical combat forces respond to threats throughout the entire rear area.

Base and base cluster commanders are designated to enhance command and control within the rear area. Commanders are responsible for ensuring the integration of their plans and for the execution of base defense. Base and base cluster commanders conduct security operations through a base defense or base cluster operations center. Unit or element commanders designated as base or base cluster commanders conduct base defense operations from their existing operations centers. These operations centers coordinate and direct the security activities of all organizations—organic and tenant—within the base or base cluster. Base defense and base cluster operations centers integrate their activities with the Marine Corps component or MAGTF rear area command and control facilities.

Unit or element commanders are assigned as base or base cluster commanders since they normally possess the personnel and equipment to command and control base defense operations. See figure 2-2.

**NOTES:**

1. As required or assigned.

2. The aviation combat element commander is shown as a base cluster commander for illustration only. Any of the component or MAGTF subordinate commanders can be designated as a base cluster commander.

Figure 2-2. Example of base defense command relationships.

For example, the aviation combat element commander could be assigned as the base commander for the base where he is located. He also could be given the responsibility for other nearby smaller bases as the base cluster commander. These bases might be occupied by organizations both internal and external to the aviation combat element. These organizations may include—

- Marine aircraft groups and squadrons.
- Marine combat service support units.

- Marine ground combat units.
- Forces from other Services or nations.
- Non-military U.S., allied, and host nation personnel.

a. Base Cluster Commander

The base cluster commander is responsible for the security and operations of his base and for coordinating the security of all of the bases within his designated cluster. He integrates the defense plans of the bases into a base cluster defense plan. The commander will establish a base cluster operations center, normally within his existing operations center, to be the focal point for planning, coordinating, and controlling the base cluster defense.

The Vietnam conflict provides an example of the base cluster concept. Marines operated out of a major air base at Da Nang, as did various U.S. Air Force and South Vietnamese Air Force units. The Marines also operated out of two outlying facilities. Initially base defense responsibilities were not well thought out. On 28 October 1965 the enemy successfully penetrated one of the outlying facilities and destroyed 19 aircraft. As a result, Major General Lewis W. Walt—Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force—placed Colonel George W. Carrington in charge of “...internal security provided by the various commands and units at Da Nang” to establish an integrated defense. Colonel Carrington’s duties included coordinating the defensive measures of the two outlying facilities with Da Nang. In Colonel Carrington’s own words, his responsibilities:

...included field artillery battery positions (but I could not infringe upon command responsibilities of the artillery regimental commander), water points, bridge and ferry crossing sites. LAAM [light anti-aircraft missile] sites on mountain peaks, ammunition dumps, supply dumps, and units of the MAW [Marine aircraft wing].

While the titles and terminology may differ, this arrangement is essentially the same as the base cluster concept.

b. Base Commander

The base commander is responsible for everything that takes place within the base. For base defense purposes all forces—organic and tenant—within the base are under the base commander's operational control. The base commander establishes a base defense operations center, normally within his existing operations center, to assist in the planning, coordinating, integration, and control of defense activities.

Subordinate commander's within the Marine component or the MAGTF may be designated as base commanders. They will be responsible for all operations within the boundaries of the base. They will also be responsible for coordination and communication with other higher and adjacent organizations.

The Vietnam conflict also illustrates the base commander concept. Marine Aircraft Group 16 was the major command located at the Marble Mountain Air Facility. Colonel Thomas J. O'Conner—the Marine Aircraft Group 16 Commanding

Officer—integrated the security efforts of his own group with combat service support personnel and Seabees located at Marble Mountain. This integration was accomplished from his group command post.

After the establishment of the Da Nang base cluster, Colonel O’Conner continued to receive his taskings for air operations from 1st MAW, while coordinating the defense of his base with Colonel Carrington.

Chapter 3

Planning

“Planning is an essential and significant part of the broader field of command and control. We can even argue that planning constitutes half of command and control, which includes influencing the conduct of current evolutions and planning future evolutions.”

—MCDP 5, *Planning*

While the battlespace may be geographically divided into deep, close, and rear area segments to ease planning and decentralized execution, a commander must always view the battlespace as an indivisible entity. This is because events in one part of the battlespace may have profound and often unintended effects throughout the entire battlespace.

We must not minimize or treat the rear area as an afterthought in the planning effort. Rear area operations must be an integrated, continuous part of the planning process. As in close and deep operations, the commander must assess the effects of rear area operations in achieving his mission so he can effectively use all of his valuable resources. Part of his assessment includes envisioning the ultimate organization, structure, and resources necessary to conduct a given operation—and then conducting reverse planning to support that vision. Simply put, he must “begin with the end in mind.”

Rear area operations are continuous. They occur before, during and after close and deep operations. The disruption of critical activities in the rear area by enemy action can reverse an otherwise successful operation or degrade the effectiveness of close and deep operations.

3001. Marine Corps Planning Process

The Marine Corps planning process (MCP) is designed to support the commander's decisionmaking. It helps organize the thought processes of the commander and his staff throughout the planning and execution of military operations. It focuses on the threat and is based on the Marine Corps warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare. Since planning is an essential part of command and control, the MCP recognizes the centrality of the commander in planning. It capitalizes on the principle of unity of effort and supports the creation and maintenance of tempo. The three tenets of the MCP are *top down guidance*, the *single battle concept*, and *integrated planning*.

The MCP organizes the planning process into six manageable, logical steps. (See figure 3-1.) It provides the commander and his staff a means to organize their planning activities and transmit the plan to subordinates and subordinate commands. Through this process, all levels of command can begin their planning effort with a common understanding of the mission and commander's intent. The MCP can be as detailed or as abbreviated as time, staff

resources, experience, and the situation allow. See MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process* for more information.




Figure 3-1. The Marine Corps planning process.

Planning centers on the commander. Through *top down planning*, the commander provides the direction and intent required to ensure unity of effort by all parts of the force. This allows the development of the priority of actions, resource allocations, and the focus of effort throughout the mission. The commander's guidance—expressed in terms of his vision of *achieving a decision* as well as the *shaping actions* required to accomplish his mission—gives those personnel planning rear area operations a clearer picture of how those operations support overall mission success.

Just as our maneuver warfare doctrine orients us towards defeating the enemy's center of gravity by exploiting one or more critical vulnerabilities, our opponent can be expected to attempt the same action against our friendly centers of gravity and associated critical vulnerabilities. Airfields, logistics units, installations, facilities and resources located in the rear area are not merely subject to attack, they are, in many cases, the preferred targets. Thus the analysis of friendly centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities helps us identify those vital areas and assets essential to the success of the force. This knowledge allows us to identify and prioritize those actions that will preserve the warfighting capability of the total force and increase its operational reach.

The rear area is a vital part of the commander's *single battle*. While the battle is normally won in the close or deep fights, failure to properly plan and execute operations in the rear area can delay or even prevent victory. To avoid diverting combat power from essential close and deep operations needed to win his single battle, the commander has to carefully plan and efficiently execute rear area operations.

It is through the *single battle concept* that the efforts of the total force are focused to accomplish the mission. While dividing the battlespace into close, deep and rear areas offers a certain degree of utility, the commander and his staff must retain the conceptual view of the single battle to ensure unity of effort throughout planning and execution.

Integrated planning provides the commander and his staff a disciplined approach to planning that is systematic,

coordinated, and thorough. It helps planners consider all relevant factors, reduce omissions, and share information across all the warfighting functions (*maneuver, intelligence, fires, logistics, command and control, and force protection*). Integrated planning requires appropriate warfighting function representation to ensure operations are integrated across the battlespace. The eight rear area functions are addressed during the planning process within the broader context of the warfighting functions. Integration reduces the potential for unintended consequences and diminishes the tendency to “stovepipe” or miss critical tasks.

3002. Warfighting Functions

The warfighting functions encompass all military activities in the battlespace. Planners consider and integrate the warfighting functions when analyzing how best to accomplish the mission. Critical to this approach to planning is the coordination of activities, in this case the eight rear area operations, not only within each warfighting function but also among all warfighting functions. By using the warfighting functions as integration elements, planners ensure that all actions are focused toward a single purpose.

While portions of all rear area functions must be addressed within each warfighting function, certain rear area functions have more prominence in specific warfighting functions. The figures and discussions below describe the relationship between the warfighting functions and the rear area functions.

a. Force Protection

Force protection involves those measures to conserve our own forces' fighting potential so that it can be applied at the decisive time and place. These actions imply more than base defense and individual protective measures. Force protection is one of the major concerns of rear area operations. While force protection considerations are a factor in all military planning, security, intelligence, area management, movements, and host nation support are rear area functions that will receive prominent attention within this warfighting function.




Figure 3-2. Force protection.

b. Logistics

Logistics encompasses all activities required to move and sustain military forces. Strategic logistics involves the acquisition and stocking of war materials and the generation

and movement of forces and materials to various theaters. At the opposite end of the spectrum, tactical logistics is concerned with sustaining forces in combat. It deals with the feeding and care, arming, fueling, maintaining, and movement of troops and equipment. Operational logistics links the strategic source of the means of war to its tactical employment. Logistics support constitutes one of the major components of rear area operations. Sustainment, area management, movements, infrastructure development, and host nation support are rear area functions which may be emphasized within this warfighting function.




Figure 3-3. Logistics.

c. Command and Control

Command and control encompasses all military operations and functions, harmonizing them into a meaningful whole. It provides the intellectual framework and physical structures

through which commanders transmit their intent and decisions to the force and receive feedback on the results. In short, command and control is the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. This warfighting function encompasses all eight rear area functions.




Figure 3-4. Command and control.

d. Maneuver

Maneuver is the movement of forces for the purpose of gaining an advantage over the enemy in order to accomplish our objectives. While tactical maneuver aims to gain an advantage in combat, maneuver within the rear area will be directed at positioning reserves, resources and fire support assets in position for potential advantage over the enemy. The rear area functions of intelligence, area management, and

movements will all be significant planning considerations within this warfighting function.




Figure 3-5. Maneuver.

e. Fires

We employ fires to delay, disrupt, degrade, or destroy enemy capabilities, forces, or facilities as well as to affect the enemy’s will to fight. The use of fires is not the wholesale attack of every enemy unit, position, piece of equipment, or installation. Rather, it is the selective application of fires, usually in conjunction with maneuver, to reduce or eliminate a key element, resulting in a major disabling of the enemy’s capabilities. Security, communications, intelligence, sustainment, movements, and infrastructure development are rear area functions which are emphasized within the warfighting function of fires.




Figure 3-6. Fires.

f. Intelligence

Intelligence is an ongoing activity that underpins all planning and operations. It provides an understanding of the enemy and the battlespace as well as assists in identifying enemy centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. Intelligence cannot provide certainty; uncertainty is an inherent attribute of war. Rather, intelligence estimates the possibilities and probabilities in an effort to reduce uncertainty to a reasonable level. Intelligence operations are conducted to support the entire battlespace—including the rear area. They require an appropriate level of planning and the commitment of resources to support the commander’s single battle.

National and theater intelligence agencies routinely prepare and update intelligence products specifically focused on supporting rear area operations. The intelligence section must anticipate the assigned area of operations and gather

information on existing infrastructure and transportation, communication, and logistical nodes. Beginning with any existing intelligence preparation of the battlespace products, the intelligence section enhances the commander’s and staff’s understanding of the battlespace. In addition to support considerations mentioned above, the intelligence effort must anticipate enemy courses of action and analyze the terrain in respect to rear area security concerns. This warfighting function encompasses all eight rear area functions.




Figure 3-7. Intelligence.

3003. The Operational Planning Team

To assist in the planning effort, the commander may establish an operational planning team. Built around a core of planners from the G-3 future operations section, the operational planning team has additional representatives from the

remaining primary staff sections. Other special staff representatives and subject matter experts may also be assigned to the operational planning team as appropriate to the mission. Liaison officers from adjacent, subordinate and supporting organizations, to include the rear area operations center, may also be assigned to the operational planning team. Members of the operational planning team may be designated as warfighting function representatives. Warfighting function representation may be drawn from the various representatives and liaisons assigned to the operational planning team based on their experience and training in the functional area.

The operational planning team considers issues pertaining to all eight functions of rear area operations. Occasionally, the operational planning team will be joined by a subject matter expert in one of the functional areas that is being explored in depth by the planning team. The rear area planning representative is concerned with issues involving *all* rear area functional areas.

The rear area planning representative serves as the focal point for information on the rear area. The rear area planning representative passes rear area information requests from the MAGTF operational planning team to the rear area coordinator or rear area commander, if designated. Information on rear area unit capabilities is provided to the MAGTF operational planning team by the rear area planning representative.

Once the MAGTF operation order is published, the rear area planning representative will aid the plan's execution by

returning to the rear area operations center, if established, as a staff member in the operations section. If required, the rear area planning representative will return to the MAGTF operational planning team, as often as necessary, to support additional MAGTF planning efforts.

Since rear area operations support the conduct of the single battle, tasks for the conduct of rear area functions should be found in the basic plan or order. Amplifying information will be located in many annexes of the operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD). Chief among these is Appendix 16, Rear Area Operations, of Annex C, Operations. (See Appendix A of this publication for the format.) Additional information on rear area operations may be present in Annexes A, Task Organization; B, Intelligence; D, Logistics; E, Personnel; G, Civil Affairs; J, Command Relationships; and P, Host Nation Support.

3004. Liaisons

Liaison personnel play a critical role during the planning for rear area operations. As warfare has become more complex, communications have become more important. Large forces maneuvering over widely dispersed terrain using combined arms and often involving forces from other Services and other countries, make the requirement for reliable communications of tasks and the details that support the task a key to successful conduct of operations. The potential for confusion is high and the need for knowledge and understanding at all levels of command crucial. Liaison personnel from the

component, MEF, and major subordinate commands, help reduce this confusion.

Commanders send liaisons to participate in their respective higher headquarter's operational planning teams. These liaisons are highly qualified and specifically chosen for their role in the planning process. They represent their commander and are intended to provide subject matter expertise. More importantly, they serve as a conduit between their parent command and the command at which the planning is ongoing. The liaison must be able to convey the commander's intent, understanding of assigned mission, and be able to represent his position. The liaison must be able to think like his commander. In doing this, the liaison will also be able to gather the right kinds of information to convey back to his commander to support the planning ongoing at his parent command. The liaison may have limited decision making ability, largely based on the trust and confidence the commander has in him.

Liaisons are fundamental to commanders being kept abreast of future operations planning. They prevent the stovepiping of operational planning. Whenever possible, the exchange of liaisons should be reciprocal. Both commands exchanging liaisons would then get the total picture during the planning or execution of operations.

Liaisons must be—

- Tactically and technically proficient within their functional area of expertise.

- Knowledgeable in the sending command's operating procedures.
- Knowledgeable in the sending command's current and future operations plans.
- Able to represent the commander's position.
- Familiar with the receiving unit's doctrine, operating procedures and organization for command and staff functioning.

As an example, the rear area coordinator or rear area commander might assign a liaison officer to the MEF operational planning team. This liaison identifies the concerns and the considerations of the rear area coordinator or commander to the operational planning team. This approach maintains a clear line of communication between the MEF commander, major subordinate commanders, and the rear area coordinator or commander.

Chapter 4

Execution

“Plans and orders exist for those who receive and execute them rather than those who write them. Directives must be written with an appreciation for the practical problems of execution.”

—MCDP 5, *Planning*

While rear area operations are *planned* to facilitate unity of effort throughout the battlespace, specific rear area functions are tasked to appropriate commanders for *execution*. The commander may assign any or all of the eight rear area operations to his subordinate commanders or he may elect to retain control of one or more of them within his own headquarters staff. Regardless of which division of labor he chooses, all eight rear area operations must be addressed.

4001. Security

Commanders have an inherent responsibility for the security of their personnel, equipment and facilities. The component commander and the MAGTF commander are ultimately responsible for the security of their assigned rear areas. The rear area may be divided into smaller geographic areas to enhance overall command and control. In all cases, units are responsible for their local security.

Security operations are conducted to assure force protection, freedom of action, and successful operations. They include both active and passive measures. Active measures include—

- Organizing for defensive operations.
- Coordinating reconnaissance and surveillance.
- Providing security to convoys.
- Positioning air defense units in the rear area.
- Establishing liaison with fire support organizations.
- Employing close air support.
- Establishing reaction forces.
- Developing defensive plans and positioning assets in support of them.
- Training in defensive skills.

Passive measures include—

- Camouflage.
- Dispersion.
- Cover.

The objectives of security operations are to—

- Prevent or minimize disruption of support operations.
- Protect personnel, supplies, equipment, and facilities.
- Protect lines of communications.
- Prevent or minimize disruption of command and control.
- Defeat, contain or nullify any threat in the rear area.

Security operations in the rear area require detailed planning and aggressive execution. They must be integrated with all other operations. Subordinate units are responsible for the conduct of local security operations, but must coordinate with the overall rear area coordinator. Security operations include—

- Populace and resource control operations.
- Enemy prisoner of war operations.
- Noncombatant evacuation operations.
- Civilian control operations.
- Area damage control operations.
- Combat operations

Other operations conducted within the rear area which facilitate the conduct of security operations include—

- Deception operations.
- Civil affairs operations.
- Nuclear, biological, and chemical defense operations.
- Psychological operations.

Security operations in the rear area require detailed planning and aggressive execution. All subordinate units are responsible for the conduct of local security operations and must coordinate such operations with the main combat operations center or rear area operations center.

a. Populace and Resource Control Operations

Populace and resource control operations are conducted to locate and neutralize insurgent or guerilla activities. Normally

host nation police, civilian, or military units, carry out these activities. Often these operations are conducted with or supported by U.S. military forces, particularly military police. These operations are primarily done in conjunction with civil affairs operations. Population and resource control operations assist the establishment and maintenance of positive relationships between forces and local populations.

b. Enemy Prisoner of War Operations

Enemy prisoner of war operations are normally conducted by military police and supported by other forces as required. Policies and procedures for the security, receipt, processing, and transfer of enemy prisoners of war will be generated from the senior commander and promulgated down to all other commands to ensure the efficient conduct of the operations. Since enemy prisoners of war are normally held, on a temporary basis, in rear areas, the rear area operations center oversees the conduct of the operations. The MAGTF or designated major subordinate command executes most of the functions for the control, care, and transfer of enemy prisoners of war. Enemy prisoners of war captured by the Marine Corps forces are transferred to a designated U.S. theater organization for further transfer to the host nation.

c. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Noncombatant evacuation operations are conducted to ensure the safety and security of U.S. citizens, and selected foreign nationals. These operations are normally conducted on short notice, and require critical resources such as transportation,

security forces, communications capability, and facilities. This requires extensive, detailed, and integrated planning. Noncombatant evacuation operations planning includes ensuring that the mission can be conducted without prejudice to ongoing operations. Evacuees can have a negative impact on the conduct of other rear area operations. Specifically, the requirements to control their movement in hostile areas, provide facilities for their use, and deploy security forces to evacuate them all can detract from other rear area operations.

d. Civilian Control Operations

Civilian control operations include the collection, retention, and interrogation of civilian internees, detainees, and refugees. While normally a host nation requirement, U.S. forces participate when directed. The Law of War, rules of engagement, and other established agreements guide participation with the host nation. Marine Corps forces will not, unless specifically directed by higher headquarters, assume responsibility for refugees. Marine Corps forces can assist in directing or stopping the movement of civilians when they are in danger or hinder military operations.

e. Area Damage Control Operations

Reducing the potential of damage to rear area infrastructure is a critical concern. This is especially important given the destructive capabilities of today's weapon systems. Planning and executing these operations should occur at the lowest level of command. Initial area damage control operations are tied in with force protection measures as both attempt to protect

existing assets. If an attack is successful, and damage has been inflicted, then area damage control operations will include recovery and restoration efforts. Facilities and equipment will be fixed and returned to normal operations.

Area damage control operations include actions taken before, during or after hostile, natural or manmade disasters, to reduce the probability of damage and minimize its effect. Integrated planning is key. The Marine Corps component commander, area or MAGTF commander, base or base cluster commander must ensure specific responsibilities are designated and that all possible coordination with Marine Corps, other Service, and host nation forces has been accomplished. Detailed procedures, command relationships, and responsibilities should be spelled out in the OPORD or fragmentary order. These plans must be integrated at all levels of command to ensure rapid and appropriate response.

f. Combat Operations

All forces must look carefully at their vulnerabilities to ascertain the level of risk each presents and to be able to constantly reassess how they might be better protected. Combat operations, including both active and passive measures, are planned for and conducted to counter a threat to operations in the rear area. Table 4-1 illustrates the levels of threats and probable responses.

To counter level I and II threats, local security forces (sometimes referred to as response forces) and internal security capabilities are used. The Marine Corps component

and MAGTF commander normally establish a tactical combat force to counter level III threats. The tactical combat force is a task organized combat unit capable of quickly responding to enemy threats. The tactical combat force can range in size from a company to a regiment depending on the situation and factors of METT-T.

Threat Level	Possible Threat	Response Force
Level I	Agents, sympathizers, terrorists, saboteurs	Unit, base, and base cluster self-defense measures
Level II	Small tactical units, unconventional forces, guerillas	Self defense measures and local response force(s) with organic supporting arms
Level III	Large tactical units (air/helicopterborne, amphibious)	Tactical combat force

Table 4-1. Threat levels and response forces.

The tactical combat force mission could be assigned to a combat unit temporarily in the rear area, or to a designated task organized force with the capability to perform the mission. The tactical combat force should be capable of controlling fires, ground and air, and of coordinating its actions with other Marine, joint, or host nation forces. The tactical combat force should have sufficient mobility and be located in a position which will enable it to respond to potential threats in a timely fashion. The MAGTF rear area

commander, if designated, directs MAGTF tactical combat force operations, ensuring its integration with other rear area activities.

The rear area commander will plan for and execute tactical combat force missions in accordance with the overall commander's concept of operations. The rear area operations center, if established, monitors events and is the conduit for communications throughout the rear area for the tactical combat force.

4002. Communications

Good communications throughout the battlespace enables command and control. Conversely, effective rear area support operations ensure that a communication system is reliable, redundant and secure. To ensure operational effectiveness, this communication system must be linked to the rear area operations center, if established. The network should include higher, adjacent and subordinate commands—including joint or combined—supporting organization(s), and the entire MAGTF.

4003. Intelligence

Effective and timely intelligence—and counterintelligence—is essential to the planning and conduct of operations in the rear area. Accurate intelligence is particularly important in the rear area, because limited combat forces are available for security

operations and because the activities in this area are time sensitive. A continuous, integrated intelligence preparation of the battlespace is important to the commander and staff. This allows the rear area commander to maintain situational awareness on the effects of enemy capabilities, terrain, and weather on his operations over time. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace should include areas adjacent, forward, and rearward of the designated rear area because specific units and activities in those areas can have a pronounced effect on the activities in the rear area.

Counterintelligence is one of the most important ways for local commanders to contribute to the intelligence system in the rear area. Counterintelligence activities include investigations, operations, collection, reporting, analysis, production, and dissemination. It assists commanders in identifying enemy target priorities in the friendly rear area. This enhances the force protection aspects of rear area operations.

The intelligence section of the rear area operations center must be able to communicate directly with higher, adjacent and subordinate organizations (Marine, joint, combined and host nation) to ensure the timely flow of information and intelligence products. The main command post should ensure that the rear command post is provided with all the intelligence it requires to conduct rear area operations. At a minimum, these products should include an intelligence estimate, modified combined obstacle overlay, and decision support template. The section maintains a situation map of the rear area and areas from which threat activities can directly

influence rear area operations. The section must develop intelligence requirements; such as for electronic warfare, operations security, interrogator translator teams, or imagery support. Since this section normally lacks the assets with which to gather and analyze information, the support must be provided from other intelligence centers.

4004. Sustainment

Sustainment of the force must be balanced with protection of the force and accomplishment of the overall mission. Fully integrated logistics support enables tactical operations. The combat service support unit plans, executes, and manages sustainment operations throughout the Marine commander's battlespace. To ensure success, sustainment planning must be fully integrated into the overall mission planning.

Combat service support units plan, execute, and manage sustainment operations throughout the battlespace. The rear area operations center, if established, monitors sustainment activities in the rear area to deconflict them with other activities. A sustainment section assists in determining requirements for support of sustainment operations. It ensures the integration of planned requirements with movements, area management, and other rear area functions. This section monitors protection and movement issues for convoys and interfaces with the bases for their sustainment requirements. The sustainment section will also interface with the joint rear area coordinator to ensure the capabilities of the sustainment

units and the requirements of the Marine Corps forces are understood.

4005. Area Management

Area management affects the successful conduct of rear area operations. Positioning assets has a direct effect on force protection and support. While the commander is ultimately responsible for area management within his battlespace, he normally assigns specific management responsibilities to other staff officers or subordinate commanders.

The rear area commander, together with his superior commander, determines the amount and type of usable space available. Positioning is based on—

- Unit mission (concept of intended use).
- Physical battlespace requirements.
- Suitability and survivability of available facilities.
- Current threat assessment.
- Supportability.
- Lines of communication.
- Terrain.
- Risk.

The commander uses these factors throughout planning and execution to ensure the maximum use of limited resources, facilities, and terrain.

During planning, the rear area commander develops an area management overlay. This overlay should be provided to all subordinate units. It should include current and proposed laydown sites. This overlay is a vital management tool for the rear area commander's use, especially when coupled with the movement control plan and the security plan.

4006. Movements

The ability to control movements into, within, and out of the rear area is critical. Joint Pub 3-10, *Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations*, describes movements as—

Movements within a [joint rear area] involve the receipt of combat forces and their movement to forward areas.

Movements can be tactical, operational, or administrative, and are normally conducted as part of the tactical, logistics, force protection, or deception plans. The ability to *control* movements into, within, and out of the rear area is critical for the support of the entire MEF. A detailed movement control plan will help ensure all movements into and out of the rear area are synchronized and controlled.

Within the joint doctrine pertaining to *movements* is the separate, but closely related term, *movement control*. Movement control is defined in Joint Pub 1-02 as—

planning, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications; also an organization responsible for these functions.

Thus, movement control involves functions *and* agencies.

a. Movement Control Functions

Joint Pub 4-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control*, describes the functions of movement control as—

- Planning.
- Apportioning.
- Allocating.
- Deconflicting.
- Validating priorities.
- Coordinating movements.
- In-transit visibility and force tracking.

Joint Pub 4-01.3 identifies these principles of movement control:

- Centralized control/decentralized execution.
- Flexible movement.
- Regulated movement.
- Maximized use of carrying capacity.
- Forward support.

Together the functions and principles form the basis of movement control planning.

b. Movement Control Agencies

At the Marine Corps component and MEF levels, responsibility for the planning, prioritization, allocation and execution of movements belong to the *force movement control center*. The force movement control center is normally under the staff cognizance of the G-4, but could be placed within the established rear area command and control facility. The MEF commander normally tasks the *logistics and movement coordination center*, located in the force service support group, to develop and execute the MEF movement control plan. The plan includes, at a minimum, routes, checkpoints, unit locations, a time table, and prioritization information.

Assisting the logistics and movement coordination center are the *regional movement coordination center* and the *unit movement coordination center*. The regional movement coordination center may be established to consolidate the marshaling and preparation for movement of a number of units. This is an optional agency that may be used based on the scope of the operation. Each major subordinate unit has a unit movement coordination center. This agency prepares the unit for movement. The force movement control center, logistics and movement coordination center, regional movement coordination center, and unit movement coordination center are primarily peacetime organizations. They must be augmented to function in wartime with additional personnel and equipment, such as command and control systems.

A movement control section is established within the rear area operations center to coordinate movement. It communicates with other Service and joint movement control agencies.

While not commanding the forces responsible for conducting or enforcing movement control, this section is responsible for monitoring and supervising movements for the rear area commander. The movement control section in the rear area operations center will ensure the movement control plan supports the overall rear area operations requirements; e.g., security and sustainment. The section will not, except where emergent requirements dictate, subvert the execution of the plan or the priorities and policies promulgated by the force movement control center or logistics and movement coordination center.

4007. Infrastructure Development

Infrastructure generally refers to fixed and permanent installations, fabrications, or facilities that can be used for the support and protection of forces. Infrastructure development normally focuses on facility security modification and battle damage repair, which includes main supply route repair and improvement. In underdeveloped areas, construction of temporary facilities is a key planning consideration. These are normally austere facilities designed for short term use; however, their construction can be time, manpower, and equipment intensive. The use of host nation support and civilian logistic capabilities manpower, equipment, supplies, materiel, and facilities should be planned for to reduce the impact on Marine Corps forces.

The rear area operations center normally prioritizes and coordinates infrastructure development activities within the

rear area in order enhance the overall effectiveness of operations. Planning and monitoring of these activities is critical because any delays in building facilities or enhancing the security of critical sites could adversely impact the conduct of actions in the close and deep battles.

4008. Host Nation Support

The use of host nation support is intended to enhance the overall effectiveness of Marine Corps forces. Host nation support is not just logistics. It can come in many forms, but the Marine Corps normally plans for the use of personnel, vehicles, supplies, and facilities. If the host nation is sufficiently developed, it can include petroleum products, electricity, and water. Maximizing the use of host nation capabilities in the rear area increases the availability of Marine Corps logistics capabilities for the close and deep battles.

The Marine Corps component commander is responsible for obtaining host nation support for Marine Corps forces based on the joint force commander's directions and guidance. Commanders at all levels should determine their shortfalls in capabilities that they cannot resolve at their level and forward those requirements to the next higher commander. These shortfalls eventually end up with the Marine Corps component commander who coordinates with the joint force commander to establish the agreements necessary to provide the support.

The rear area coordinator or rear area commander may be tasked with managing the host nation support. Control of this

support is particularly important when security forces are involved which may be called upon to support U.S. forces in the rear battle. The host nation security plan must be integrated into the rear area security plans to ensure coordination and supportability

Normally, the senior combat service support unit directs the use of host nation support. The rear command post or operations center assists in identifying the requirements and priorities, and in allocating the support. This occurs for most assets from the host nation as they are located and used in the rear area, most often in support of sustainment activities. The rear area operations center may also be the focal point for the overall management of the integration of host nation forces into the commander's battlespace.

When planning host nation support, the commander should consider the following factors—

- Effect of host nation support on friendly force morale.
- Effect on security.
- Ability to support.
- Dependability or willingness of host nation to accomplish tasks.
- Availability of needed support.
- Status of standing international agreements.

Appendix A

**Rear Area Operations Appendix
Format**

Rear area operations information is generally contained in Appendix 16 of Annex C, Operations. Depending on the mission, size, scope, and duration of the operation and the size of the assigned force, it may be necessary to create a separate annex for rear area operations (for example, Annex R).

Detailed information on the format and content of an OPLAN or OPORD is found in Appendix G of MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*.

Copy no. ____ of ____ copies
OFFICIAL DESIGNATION OF COMMAND
PLACE OF ISSUE
Date/time group
Message reference number

APPENDIX 16 TO ANNEX C TO OPERATION ORDER
OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODEWORD) ()
REAR AREA OPERATIONS ()

- () REFERENCES: a. Any relevant plans or orders.
b. Required maps and charts.
c. Other relevant documents.
1. () Situation. Summarize the overall operational situation as it relates to rear area operations.
- a. () Enemy. Summarize the enemy situation, force disposition, intelligence capabilities, and possible courses of action. If applicable, reference intelligence estimates or summaries. Address any specific information that bears directly on planned rear area operations.
- b. () Friendly. Summarize the situation of those friendly forces that may directly affect rear area operations. Address any critical limitations and any other planned rear area operations.
- c. () Assumptions. List any assumptions made of friendly, enemy, or third-party capabilities, limitations, or

courses of action. Describe the conditions that the commander believes will exist at the time the plan becomes an order. Omit in orders.

2. () Mission. State the rear area mission in a clear, concise statement that answers the questions: Who, what, when, where, and why.

3. () Execution

a. () Concept of Operations. Summarize how the commander visualizes the execution of rear area operations from its beginning to its termination. Describe how rear area operations will support the command's operational mission. Summarize the concepts for supervision, evolution, and termination of rear area operations. The concept of operations should specify which rear area functions will be controlled by the issuing headquarters and which will be tasked to subordinate commands for execution.

(1) () The concept of operations may be a single paragraph or divided into two or more paragraphs depending upon the complexity of the operation.

(2) () When an operation involves various phases (i.e., peace or pre-hostilities, crisis, war, post-hostilities etc.), the concept of operations should be prepared in subparagraphs describing rear area operations in each phase.

(3) () Tabs A-H may be used as necessary to cover supporting concepts for each of the eight rear area functions of rear area operations.

b. () Rear Area Operations Tasks. Identify the major rear area functions assigned as tasks to subordinate commands.

c. () Coordinating Instructions. Address any mutual support issues relating to the elements of rear area operations.

4. () Administration and Logistics. Address any rear area operations-related administrative or logistic requirements.

5. () Command and Control. List any rear area operations-related command and control instructions. State the command structure for rear area operations. Identify any special rear area operations communications and reporting requirements.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Name
Rank and Service
Title

TABS: (as appropriate)

- A — Security
- B — Communications
- C — Intelligence
- D — Sustainment
- E — Area Management
- F — Movements
- G — Infrastructure Development
- H — Host Nation Support

OFFICIAL:

s/

Name

Rank and Service

Title

Appendix B

Glossary

Section I Acronyms

Note: Acronyms change over time in response to new operational concepts, capabilities, doctrinal changes and other similar developments. The following publications are the sole authoritative sources for official military acronyms:

1. Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
2. MCRP 5-12C, *Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

FM	field manual
FMFM	Fleet Marine Force manual
LAAM	light anti-aircraft missile
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MAW	Marine aircraft wing
MCDP	Marine Corps doctrinal publication
MCPP	Marine Corps planning process

MCRP Marine Corps reference publication
MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication
MEF Marine expeditionary force
METT-T mission, enemy, terrain and weather,
troops and support available, time available
MRAC Marine rear area coordinator
MRACOM Marine rear area commander
MRAOC Marine rear area operations center
MRACP Marine rear area command post

NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical

OPLAN operation plan
OPORD operation order

RAC rear area coordinator
RACOM rear area commander
RAOC rear area operations center
RACP rear area command post

UNAAF Unified Action Armed Forces

Section II Definitions

Note: Definitions of military terms change over time in response to new operational concepts, capabilities, doctrinal changes and other similar developments. The following publications are the sole authoritative sources for official military definitions of military terms:

1. Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
2. MCRP 5-12C, *Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

A

area damage control—Measures taken before, during, or after hostile action or natural or manmade disasters, to reduce the probability of damage and minimize its effects. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of operations—An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of responsibility—The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. 2. In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by observation. Also called **AOR**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

B

base—1. A locality from which operations are projected or supported. 2. An area or locality containing installations which provide logistic or other support. 3. Home airfield or home carrier. See also base of operations; facility. (Joint Pub 1-02)

base cluster—In base defense operations, a collection of bases, geographically grouped for mutual protection and ease of command and control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

base defense—The local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base, to ensure that the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to U.S. forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

base defense operations center—A command and control facility established by the base commander to serve as the focal point for base security and defense. It plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all base defense efforts, and coordinates and integrates into area security operations with the rear area operations center/rear tactical operations center. (Joint Pub 1-02)

battlespace—All aspects of air, surface, subsurface, land, space, and electromagnetic spectrum which encompass the area of influence and area of interest. (MCRP 5-12C)

C

civil-military operations—Group of planned activities in support of military operations that enhance the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities and population and which promote the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. (Joint Pub 1-02)

centers of gravity—Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant command (command authority)—Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through

the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called **COCOM**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combat operations center—The primary operational agency required to control the tactical operations of a command that employs ground and aviation combat, combat support, and combat service support elements or portions thereof. The combat operations center continually monitors, records, and supervises operations in the name of the commander and includes the necessary personnel and communications to do the same. Also called **COC**. (MCRP 5-12C)

command post—A unit's or subunit's headquarters where the commander and the staff perform their activities. In combat, a unit's or subunit's headquarters is often divided into echelons; the echelon in which the unit or subunit commander is located or from which such commander operates is called a command post. (Joint Pub 1-02)

communications zone—Rear part of theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone) which contains the lines of communications, establishments for supply and evacuation, and other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

coordinating authority—A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

E

essential elements of friendly information—Key questions likely to be asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities, so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness. Also called **EEFI**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

F

fire support coordination center—A single location in which are centralized communications facilities and personnel incident to the coordination of all forms of fire support. (Joint Pub 1-02)

force protection—Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members,

facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (Joint Pub 1-02)

H

host nation—A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, or to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host nation support—Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crisis or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

I

intelligence preparation of the battlespace—(see Joint Pub 1-02.) In Marine Corps usage, the systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. Also called **IPB**. (MCRP 5-12C)

J

joint base—For purposes of base defense operations, a joint base is a locality from which operations of two or more of the

Military Departments are projected or supported and which is manned by significant elements of two or more Military Departments or in which significant elements of two or more Military Departments are located. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force commander—A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called **JFC**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint rear area—A specific land area within a joint force commander's operational area designated to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint rear area coordinator—The officer with responsibility for coordinating the overall security of the joint rear area in accordance with joint force commander directives and priorities in order to assist in providing a secure environment to facilitate sustainment, host nation support, infrastructure development, and movements of the joint force. The joint rear area coordinator also coordinates intelligence support and ensures that area management is practiced with due consideration for security requirements. Also called **JRAC**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint rear area operations—Those operations in the joint rear area that facilitate protection or support of the joint force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint rear tactical operations center—A joint operations cell tailored to assist the joint rear area coordinator in meeting mission responsibilities. Also called **JRTOC**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

L

liaison—That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

line of communications—All the routes, land, water, and air, which connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. Also called **LOC**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

logistics—The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

M

movement control—The planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. 2. An organization responsible for the

planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. Also called movement control center. (Joint Pub 1-02)

O

operational control—Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called **OPCON**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

R

rear area—For any particular command, the area extending forward from its rear boundary to the rear of the area assigned to the next lower level of command. This area is provided primarily for the performance of support functions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

rear area operations center—A command and control facility that serves as an area/subarea commander's planning, coordinating, monitoring, advising, and directing agency for area security operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

rear area security—The measures taken before, during, and/or after an enemy airborne attack, sabotage action, infiltration, guerrilla action, and/or initiation of psychological or propaganda warfare to minimize the effects thereof. (MCRP 5-12C)

rear operations—Military actions conducted to support and permit force sustainment and to provide security for such actions. (MCRP 5-12C)

S

security—1. Measures taken by a military unit, an activity or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. 3. With respect to classified matter, it is the

condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security. (Joint Pub 1-02)

support—1. The action of a force which aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit which helps another unit in battle. Aviation, artillery, or naval gunfire may be used as a support for infantry. 3. A part of any unit held back at the beginning of an attack as a reserve. 4. An element of a command which assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (Joint Pub 1-02)

sustainment—The provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. (Joint Pub 1-02)

T

tactical combat force—A combat unit, with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets, that is assigned the mission of defeating Level III threats. (Joint Pub 1-02)

W

warfighting functions—The six mutually supporting military activities integrated in the conduct of all military operations are:

- 1. command and control**—The means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken.
- 2. maneuver**—The movement of forces for the purpose of gaining an advantage over the enemy.
- 3. fires**—Those means used to delay, disrupt, degrade, or destroy enemy capabilities, forces, or facilities as well as affect the enemy's will to fight.
- 4. intelligence**—Knowledge about the enemy or the surrounding environment needed to support decisionmaking.
- 5. logistics**—All activities required to move and sustain military forces.
- 6. force protection**—Actions or efforts used to safeguard own centers of gravity while protecting, concealing, reducing, or eliminating friendly critical vulnerabilities.
Also called **WF**. (MCRP 5-12C)

Appendix C**References****1. Joint Publications**

Joint Pub 0-2	Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
Joint Pub 1-02	Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
Joint Pub 3-0	Doctrine for Joint Operations
Joint Pub 3-10	Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations
Joint Pub 3-10.1	Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense
Joint Pub 4-0	Doctrine for Logistical Support of Joint Operations
Joint Pub 4-01.3	Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control
Joint Pub 4-02	Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations
Joint Pub 6-0	Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations
Joint Military Operations Historical Collection	

2. Marine Corps Publications

MCDP 1	Warfighting
MCDP 1-1	Strategy
MCDP 1-2	Campaigning

MCDP 1-3	Tactics
MCDP 3	Expeditionary Operations
MCDP 4	Logistics
MCDP 5	Planning
MCDP 6	Command and Control
MCWP 0-1	Marine Corps Operations
MCWP 0-1.1	Componency
MCWP 2-1	Intelligence Operations
MCWP 2-5	Counterintelligence
MCWP 3-33.1	MAGTF Civil Affairs
MCWP 3-37	MAGTF NBC
MCWP 4-1	Logistics Operations
MCWP 4-23	Transportation Operations
MCWP 4-27	Services
MCWP 4-3	Operational Logistics
MCWP 5-1	Marine Corps Planning Process
MCRP 2-12A	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
MCRP 5-12C	Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

Jack Shulimson and Major Charles M. Johnson, USMC, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, The Landing and the Buildup* (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1978)

Colonel Charles J. Quilter II, USMC Reserve, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991, With the I Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1993)

3. Army Publications

FM 55-10	Movement Control in a Theater of Operations
FM 63-3	Combat Service Support Operations: Corps
FM 63-4	Combat Service Support Operations: Theater Army Area Command
FM 90-12	Base Defense
FM 90-14	Rear Battle
FM 100-5	Operations
FM 100-7	Decisive Force, the Army in Theater
FM 100-16	Support Operations: Echelons Above Corps."

4. Miscellaneous Publications

Richard B. Frank, *Guadalcanal, The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle* (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1992)

John Miller, Jr., *Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 1989)